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HOW TO READ INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW:  STRICT CONSTRUCTION AND THE 




The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”)1 espouses a commitment to the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege (no crime without law)2 including the guarantees 
that crime definitions will be strictly construed and not be 
extended by analogy, and ambiguities will be construed in favor 
of the defendant.  Gone are the days of watered down legality in 
the face of horrendous crimes, or so it seems on the face of the 
document.3  At the same time that the Rome Statute announces 
its commitment to legality, it also provides a hierarchy of legal 
sources judges are to consider.  These sources are many and  
† Associate Professor, Willamette University, College of Law. Many thanks to 
fellow participants in the workshop on Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
International Criminal Justice hosted by Stanford Law School and the Peter Wall 
Institute for Advanced Studies of the University of British Columbia and in the 
panel on Prosecuting Domestic and International Crimes at Law & Society for their 
guidance at the late and early stages of this project, respectively. Thanks as well to 
Margaret Gander Vo, Benjamin Eckstein, and Mary Rumsey for their excellent help 
with research. 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 9, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
2 See generally Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at 
the Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 121 (2008) (describing the 
history of nullum crimen sine lege and how this principle is applied today). 
3 See id. at 192 (“Positive law, in the form of the ICC Statute, now reflects 
developments in the law made at the expense of perfect legal certainty. Now that the 
universe of international criminal law has settled in, the need for expansive 
interpretation is diminishing and the full complement of the principle of legality can 
take root.”). 
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varied and include not only the Rome Statute and other ICC 
documents but also general principles of international law and 
general principles derived from national legal systems.   
These provisions on strict construction and sources of law 
are hard to reconcile.  The abundance of often-divergent sources 
of law seems to assure that ambiguity is either everywhere or 
nowhere.  Add to this picture the backdrop of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), which 
potentially adds yet another set of sources and tools judges are to 
turn to when interpreting the Rome Statute’s crimes definitions. 
The ICC’s commitment to legality and strict construction is 
unprecedented in international criminal law (“ICL”).  The 
Nuremberg trials were notoriously lax on the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege, particularly with the invention of the new 
crimes of crimes against the peace and crimes against humanity, 
and therefore, unsurprisingly, the notion of strict construction 
gained no traction.4  The ad hoc tribunals5 contained nothing in 
their statutes related to nullum crimen sine lege, but largely 
voiced support for the principle in their judgments.6 
Despite a professed commitment to legality, the ad hoc 
tribunals eschewed strict construction in all but a few cases 
where the cost of recognizing the principle was low.7  The judges 
4 The big legality concern at Nuremberg was that crimes against the peace and 
crimes against humanity had not previously been defined as crimes in international 
law. The Nuremberg judges both dodged the issue by saying that it was not 
jurisdictional and argued that the conduct had been condemned, albeit not explicitly 
criminalized, previously. Göring’s lawyer also made, unsuccessfully, the lenity or in 
dubio pro reo argument that an ambiguity in the statute ought to be construed in his 
client’s favor. See KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 67–68, 107–08 (2009). 
5 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) are often referred to as 
the “ad hoc” tribunals due to their temporary and conflict-specific nature. 
6 See GALLANT, supra note 4, at 304; see also Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-
98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 93 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Dec. 5, 2003), (stating that the effect of nullum crimen sine lege is “ ‘that penal
statutes must be strictly construed’ and that the ‘paramount duty of the judicial
interpreter [is] to read into the language of the legislature, honestly and faithfully,
its plain and rational meaning and to promote its object’ ” and that ambiguities that
cannot be resolved with resort to canons of construction instead should be resolved
in favor of the accused) (citing Prosecutor v. Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement,
¶¶ 408, 413 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)).
7 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 500–01 
(Sept. 2, 1998) (choosing the more lenient interpretation of the law by saying that 
genocide required intentional killing). This was no great loss for the prosecution, 
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of the ad hoc tribunals were conflicted on whether any rule of 
lenity or strict construction applied.  Some judges invoked in 
dubio pro reo (doubts favor the accused) for the proposition that 
legal ambiguities be read in favor of the defendant.8  Others, 
however, insisted that in dubio pro reo only applied to findings of 
fact.9  Even the judges who recognized the principle of strict 
construction of the law generally allowed a very limited role for 
it.  They cabined the principle by putting it last, after all other 
tools of interpretation had been exhausted, and by reducing it to 
a bare formula of foreseeability, borrowed from the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), which permitted expansive 
interpretation10 and application of legal principles to new factual 
circumstances.11 
since the Rwandan genocide did not proceed through recklessness or negligence but 
rather through brutal, intentional killing. See also Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. 
IT-02-60-T, Judgement, ¶ 642 n.2057 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Jan. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Blagojevic Trial Judgement] (noting that “[i]n accordance 
with the general principle of interpretation in dubio pro reo, the Tribunals’ case law 
has opted for the interpretation most favourable to the accused and found that the 
term ‘killings’, in the context of a genocide charge, must be interpreted as referring 
to the definition of murder, i.e. intentional homicide”) (citing Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 151 (June 1, 2001) 
(concluding that there was little difference between killing and “meurtre,” but, even 
if there were, it still did not help the defendant)). Likewise, in Blagojevic, no one 
contended that the 7000 men and boys killed were killed unintentionally. Blagojevic 
Trial Judgement, ¶ 151. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 50 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the “principle of favoring the accused,” known in 
the United States as the lenity canon, and these two cases). 
8 See supra text accompanying notes 6–7. 
9 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, ¶ 416 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003) (“The Trial Chamber explicitly 
distances itself from the Defence submission that the principle in dubio pro reo 
should apply as a principle for the interpretation of the substantive criminal law of 
the Statute. As this principle is applicable to findings of fact and not of law, the Trial 
Chamber has not taken it into account in its interpretation of the law.”). The 
Appeals Chamber did not adopt this narrow reading of in dubio pro reo. Id. ¶ 417. 
10 See William A. Schabas, Interpreting the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, in 
MAN’S INHUMANITY TO MAN: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF 
ANTONIO CASSESE 849, 877 (Lal Chand Vohrah et al. eds., 2003) (citing Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000)) (stating that the legality principle “does not 
prevent a court, either at the national or international level, from determining an 
issue through a process of interpretation and clarification as to the elements of a 
particular crime”); Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on 
Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
¶¶ 37, 38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003) (“[T]he 
principle nullum crimen sine lege is, as noted by the International Military Tribunal 
in Nuremberg, first and foremost, a ‘principle of justice’ . . . . This fundamental 
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The ICC’s Rome Statute sets out the crimes over which the 
ICC has jurisdiction and provides definitions of widely ranging 
specificity for those crimes.  An ICC document drafted after the 
Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes, defines the crimes in yet 
greater detail.  Still, uncertainty over the law and, specifically, 
definitions of crimes and forms of criminal responsibility, 
remains.12  Many legal questions have yet to be answered by any 
international court.  The ad hoc tribunals have answered others, 
but the ICC is not bound by their law. 
Others have discussed the broader issue of nullum crimen 
sine lege,13 but until recently, there had been scant attention to 
the interpretive components of the Rome Statute’s legality 
guarantee.  In the past few years, however, scholars have turned 
principle ‘does not prevent a court from interpreting and clarifying the elements of a 
particular crime’. Nor does it preclude the progressive development of the law by the 
court. But it does prevent a court from creating new law or from interpreting existing 
law beyond the reasonable limits of acceptable clarification. This Tribunal must 
therefore be satisfied that the crime or the form of liability with which an accused is 
charged was sufficiently foreseeable and that the law providing for such liability 
must be sufficiently accessible at the relevant time, taking into account the 
specificity of international law when making the assessment.”) (emphasis added). 
See also Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of 
Progressive Development of Law?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1007 (2004). 
11 Prosecutor v. Hadz̆ihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Separate and 
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hunt Command Responsibility Appeal, ¶ 44, 
n.66 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003) (“A principle so held
to have been part of customary international law may . . . be applied to a new
situation where that situation reasonably falls within the application of the
principle.”). Judge Hunt invoked the object and purpose of Additional Protocol I and
IHL generally in favor of extending criminal responsibility for commanders for acts
committed by subordinates prior to the commander’s taking command. Id. ¶ 22.
12 See CASSESE, supra note 7, at 42–43 (stating that ICL remains 
“decentralized” and “fragmentary,” and “the possibility frequently arises of a 
contradictory and ‘cacophonic’ interpretation or application of international criminal 
rules”); see also Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 189 (“[T]here are ‘legality deficits’ 
within the Statute, as many crimes are vaguely or sparingly worded and key terms 
remain undefined, notwithstanding the Elements of Crimes.”). 
13 Both Gallant and Van Schaack also explore strict construction and lenity as 
part of their broader work on nullum crimen sine lege generally. Van Schaack, supra 
note 2, at 176, 189 (discussing strict construction as a corollary of nullum crimen 
sine lege). Gallant provides an extensive survey of domestic and international 
jurisdictions vis-à-vis strict construction and the prohibition on analogy, and offers 
observations on legality at the ICC. See discussion infra note 33. The Rome Statute 
in fact puts its strict construction requirement in the provision on nullum crimen 
sine lege, which makes sense. If judges construe offenses so broadly as to create new 
crimes, they effectively are creating new law retroactively. GALLANT, supra note 4, 
at 33. 
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their attention to this important issue.14  This Article seeks to 
build on this discussion by probing more deeply into the 
justifications for strict construction and the other Article 22(2) 
guarantees and assessing the extent to which they apply at the 
ICC. 
This Article seeks to answer a few seemingly simple 
questions:  What are strict construction, the ban on analogy, and 
lenity under Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute, and what role do 
and should they play in interpreting or making ICL?  This 
discussion is particularly salient in light of criticisms of 
international criminal courts playing fast and loose with the law 
in the name of “ending impunity”15 and important discussions 
regarding the inherent tension between a liberal criminal justice 
system and liberal human rights enforcement.16  Arguably, 
lenity, strict construction, and the prohibition on defining crimes 
by analogy are an important check against this illiberal 
teleological approach to criminal law.  As Professor Antonio 
Cassese, a former President at the International Criminal  
14 See generally Leila Nadya Sadat & Jarrod M. Jolly, Seven Canons of ICC 
Treaty Interpretation: Making Sense of Article 25’s Rorschach Blot, 27 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. (UK) 755 (2014) (proposing canons of construction); Leena Grover, A Call to 
Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 543, 544 (2010) 
[hereinafter Grover, A Call to Arms] (identifying “three fundamental interpretive 
dilemmas” in the interpretation of the Rome Statute); LEENA GROVER, 
INTERPRETING CRIMES IN THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT (2016) [hereinafter GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES]. 
15 See Göran Sluiter, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: Some Human Rights Concerns 
Occasioned by Selected 2009 Case Law, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 248, 257–58 (2010) 
(noting the disturbing trend of using an “object and purpose” inquiry focused on 
ending impunity to justify broad interpretations of crimes); Darryl Robinson, The 
Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. (UK) 925, 928 
(2008) [hereinafter Robinson, Identity Crisis] (discussing the conflict between 
liberalism in human rights and humanitarian law enforcement and criminal law); 
Benjamin Perrin, Searching for Law While Seeking Justice: The Difficulties of 
Enforcing International Humanitarian Law in International Criminal Trials, 39 
OTTAWA L. REV. 367, 385 (2007–2008) (discussing the tension between the goal of 
maximizing humanitarian protection in armed conflict and respecting the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial); Schabas, supra note 10, at 163 (noting the potential 
free pass for expansive judicial lawmaking that the objects and purposes gives 
judges); see also Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International 
Criminal Law, 86 IND. L.J. 1063, 1073 (2011) (“Gaps in the law are an endemic 
aspect of judicial decision making, but with ICL the gaps have at times appeared to 
swallow the rules.”). 
16 Robinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 15, at 927–32. 
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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) has stated, the 
Rome Statute “seems to evince a certain mistrust 
in . . . [j]udges.”17 
The traditional justifications for strict construction, 
imperfect even in the domestic context, are on shaky ground in 
the international context.  Other justifications for the canon, 
however, including curbing arbitrary enforcement, encouraging 
state participation in the Rome regime, and bolstering the court’s 
gravity requirement, arguably support an even more robust role 
for strict construction.  This Article also flags the oddity of using 
the doctrines of strict construction, lenity, and the prohibition on 
analogy, principles that are meant for statutory construction, in 
interpreting customary international law, which is notoriously 
amorphous and unwritten.18  How exactly does one strictly 
construe state practice and opinio juris?  Ultimately, this Article 
advocates a realistic but still robust version of the principle that 
gives judges room for interpretation and development of the law, 
yet avoids wholesale judicial crime creation.  It argues that, even 
though lenity—construing ambiguity in favor of defendants—is 
unlikely to do much work at the ICC after courts consult Article 
21 sources of law, there is independent meaning to the concept of 
strict construction.19  Borrowing from the work of John Jeffries 
on statutory interpretation, this Article argues that a better 
conception of the Article 22(2) guarantee of strict construction is 
an admonition to judges to avoid usurping the role of the 
17 David Hunt, The International Criminal Court: High Hopes, ‘Creative 
Ambiguity’ and an Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 56, 61 (2004) (stating that this puts it mildly and that “[i]t would be more 
accurate to say that the Statute evinces a deep suspicion of the Court’s judges”). 
18 Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n, First Report on 
Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, ¶ 21, A/CN.4/663 (May 17, 
2013) [hereinafter ILC CIL 1] (noting “the inherent difficulties of the topic, primarily 
the very nature of customary international law as unwritten law, and the ideological 
and theoretical controversies that are often associated with it”); see also Dov Jacobs, 
Positivism and International Criminal Law: The Principle of Legality as a Rule of 
Conflict of Theories, (draft at 18), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2046311 (noting that “[i]t is well known that difficulties arise in conceptualizing 
this source, due to the fact . . . of its inherent circularity, given States need to act as 
if it existed even before it did in order for it to exist”); Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 
138 (arguing that “perfect positivism is impossible where customary international 
law (CIL)—the practice of states bolstered by a sense of legal duty—remains an 
integral source of ICL”). 
19 Although this Article discusses Article 22(2)’s bar on analogy, the primary 
focus is on lenity and strict construction. 
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drafters.  In essence, judges should avoid contravening the clear 
intention of states parties, unduly encroaching on state 
sovereignty, and unfairly surprising defendants.  The Article 
offers a framework for assessing unfair surprise.  Subject to these 
constraints, judges should interpret the Rome Statute in a 
manner that enhances clarity in ICL.  Finally, this Article 
clarifies the proper role for the Vienna Convention’s “object and 
purpose” inquiry.  Contrary to the standard meaning given to the 
inquiry in ICL, whereby judges justify expansive interpretation 
based on the object and purpose of “ending impunity,” this Article 
contends that the proper object and purpose of the Rome Statute 
is to punish people found guilty of international crimes through a 
fair process. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I introduces the 
Rome Statute’s provision on nullum crimen sine lege, focusing in 
particular on its requirements that judges strictly construe crime 
definitions, construe ambiguous provisions in favor of 
defendants, and avoid crime creation by analogy.  It offers 
working definitions for relevant concepts and describes some of 
the difficulties in applying them, particularly in light of the Rome 
Statute’s provision setting out the sources of law the court is to 
consider.  Part II asks whether strict construction makes sense in 
the context of international crimes.  It assesses the values that 
undergird the principle, most importantly, notice, separation of 
powers, the judiciary’s role in protecting individual freedom, 
efficiency, and democratic accountability.  It concludes that the 
justifications relied on in domestic jurisdictions for strict 
construction apply more readily in the international context than 
one might think, but suffer from many of the same flaws they do 
domestically.  These flaws are often magnified at the ICC.  Part 
II also examines justifications for strict construction that are 
particular to the ICC, including promoting human rights, 
respecting state sovereignty, encouraging participation in the 
ICC framework, and ensuring that the ICC focuses its limited 
resources on the gravest crimes.  Ultimately, this Article finds 
merit to these arguments, but not enough to prioritize lenity over 
competing language in the Rome Statute itself and over other 
tools of interpretation.  Part III assesses the potential ordering 
for strict construction in light of the purposes it serves.  Part IV 
then offers a conception of strict construction that distills it to a 
few critical principles that better support the justifications for it 
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and help to square strict construction with the realities of ICL 
and the Rome Statute.  These principles are: avoiding usurping 
the authority of states, avoiding unfair surprise to defendants, 
and seeking, where possible, to clarify ICL.  This proposed 
conception of strict construction grapples with the inescapable 
fact that the great legality challenge of ICL likely is not 
ambiguity, but rather vagueness.20 
I. ARTICLE 22(2): STRICT CONSTRUCTION, THE BAR ON
ANALOGY, AND LENITY 
Although the existence of international crimes is fairly 
uncontroversial, “much of the modern history of ICL has been 
consumed by an identity crisis regarding the content and sources 
of these offenses.”21  Determining the content of these offenses is 
closely tied to legality.  ICL is considerably more codified and 
clearer now than ever before, and claims of bald after-the-fact 
crime creation will likely be less frequent.  It seems likely that, 
for the ICC, most of the fighting about legality will arise in the 
context of strict—or broad—construction of existing crimes.22  
This Part introduces the ICC’s provision on strict construction 
and attempts to situate it within the legal framework of the ICC. 
A. Article 22(2)
As part of its guarantee of legality, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court includes strict construction, a ban  
on analogy, and lenity.  In addition to the language on non-
retroactivity set out in Article 22(1),23 Article 22(2) provides: 
20 This Article uses the dictionary definition of the terms ambiguity and 
vagueness. See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster. 
com/dictionary/ambiguous (last visited July 22, 2017) (defining the word 
“ambiguous” as “capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or 
ways”); Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dict 
ionary/vague (last visited July 22, 2017) (defining the word “vague” as “not clearly 
expressed; stated in indefinite terms; not clearly defined, grasped, or understood; not 
thinking or expressing one’s thoughts clearly or precisely”). 
21 Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1073. 
22 Cf. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of 
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 195 (1985) (arguing that, due to the codification 
and development of American law, true judicial crime creation is a thing of the past 
and that the doctrines of strict construction and void for vagueness now do most of 
the heavy legality lifting in the United States.). 
23 Article 22(1) of the Rome Statute, the non-retroactivity principle, provides: “1. 
A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in 
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The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall 
not be extended by analogy.  In case of ambiguity, the definition 
shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, 
prosecuted or convicted.24 
This provision contains three overlapping guarantees in an 
attempt to translate strict construction into a variety of legal 
languages.  First, crime definitions shall be strictly construed. 
Second, crime definitions shall not be extended by analogy. 
Third, ambiguities shall be interpreted in favor of defendants or 
would-be defendants. 
In the Anglo-American tradition of criminal law, strict 
construction is synonymous with lenity.  It is the notion that any 
doubt in the meaning of a statutory provision should be resolved 
in favor of the defendant.25  In French law, by contrast, strict 
construction boils down to teleological inquiry into the intent of 
the legislator and a prohibition on defining the crime by 
analogy.26  An ICC Trial Chamber in the Prosecutor  v. Katanga 
question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.” Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22(1). Article 22(3) provides: “This article 
shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under international 
law independently of this Statute.” Id. at art. 22(3). 
24 Id. at art. 22(2). 
25 ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 67 (4th ed. 2003); 
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885 
(2004) (“[T]he ‘rule of lenity’—the common law doctrine, also know as ‘strict 
construction,’ that directs courts to construe statutory ambiguities in favor of 
criminal defendants”). See generally Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common 
Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345. In the United States, courts emphasize that 
lenity only applies when a provision is ambiguous, meaning susceptible to more than 
one interpretation, not when it is vague, meaning courts must guess as to its 
meaning. For vagueness, defendants must argue that the statutory provision is “void 
for vagueness.” This Article offers a reading of Article 22’s guarantee of strict 
construction that can be used to address both ambiguity and vagueness. See infra 
Part IV. 
26 The French Penal Code provides that penal law is to be strictly construed. 
CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] [PENAL CODE] art. 111-4 (Fr.) (“La loi pénale est 
d'interprétation stricte.”). The requirement entered the code in 1994 and codified a 
longstanding principle from French law. XAVIER PIN, DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL § 50 
(6th ed. 2014). Strict construction, according to Xavier Pin, requires precision in 
definitions of crimes. The Conseil constitutionel requires that criminal texts be 
sufficiently clear and precise that they preclude arbitrariness. Id. § 49. Christophe 
André has explained that strict interpretation does not mean narrow interpretation. 
Otherwise put, “only the law, but all of the law.” CHRISTOPHE ANDRÉ, DROIT PÉNAL 
SPECIAL § 5 (3d ed. 2015) (“[L]a loi, uniquement la loi, mais toute la loi”). Strict 
construction also appears to permit interpretation of more than just the statutory 
text. To interpret a statute courts will analyze the text but also engage in a 
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case likewise equated strict construction with the ban on 
analogy, in juxtaposition to Article 22(2)’s requirement that 
ambiguity be construed in favor of the defendant, which it put 
under the label “in dubio pro reo.”27  In France, the prohibition on 
analogy means that judges may not extend a crime by analogy to 
a situation that the legislator did not intend but could have 
envisioned,28 while in Germany there is no guarantee of strict 
construction or lenity.29  German law bars defining crimes by 
analogy, meaning crimes are “not [to be] interpreted in a sense 
that goes beyond their literal meaning.”30  Article 22(2)’s 
redundancies thus theoretically attempt to capture each of these 
notions of cabining judges’ ability to create new crimes under the 
guise of interpretation.  Subtle differences aside, the crux of the 
issue in all of these systems is fundamentally the same and boils 
down to the vexing question:  What is the line between 
interpretation and lawmaking? 
Still, these Article 22(2) guarantees are not as firmly 
established a set of human rights principles as one might think. 
Many states do not recognize the principles and, even where they 
do, as in the United States,31 adherence to the principle is 
patchy.32  Kenneth Gallant, the author of The Principle of  
“teleological” inquiry into the legislature’s intent, including by using legislative 
history. PIN, supra, § 50–51. 
27 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement 
Pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 52–53 (Mar. 7, 2014). 
28 PIN, supra note 26, § 52 (“L’analogie qui est strictement prohibé est l’analogie 
juridique qui consiste à étendre une incrimination à un cas que le législateur n’a pas 
prévu alors qu’il aurait pu le prévoir. Le juge en effet ne doit pas aller au-delà de la 
volunté du législateur.”). This aversion to crime creation by analogy also existed in 
U.S. law as part of strict construction. See, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 
76, 96 (1820) (“It would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle, that a case 
which is within the reason or mischief of a statute, is within its provisions, so far as 
to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of 
kindred character, with those which are enumerated.”). 
29 MARKUS D. DUBBER & TATJANA HÖRNLE, CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH 100 (2014). 
30 THOMAS VORMBAUM, A MODERN HISTORY OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 42 
(Michael Bohlander eds., 2013). 
31 See Kahan, supra note 25, at 350–51; Jeffries, supra note 22, at 198–00. 
32 See Broomhall, infra note 83, at 960, 962 (noting that “the formulation and 
status of the rule [of strict construction] in common law jurisdictions is not free from 
uncertainty, and it has been irregularly applied,” and “[l]ike the rule of strict 
construction in general, the rule relating to ambiguities is neither uniformly held to 
nor clearly defined in national systems”). 
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Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law, 
cautions that international human rights law does not require 
courts to choose the narrowest possible formulation of crimes.33 
Unlike the actual definitions of the crimes in the Rome 
Statute, Article 22 apparently was uncontroversial.34  The 
ultimate formulation of paragraph 2 stemmed from an American 
proposal that replaced a similar Japanese one.35  The Rome 
Statute’s legality provision was the product of the positive law 
inclinations of many states and states’ desire to understand and 
clearly demarcate the risks to states’ own government officials.36  
Finally, states wanted to define and understand their own 
obligations, since the Rome Statute demands actions from 
states.37 
A critical ambiguity in Article 22(2) itself is whether the 
Article 22(2) guarantees apply only to the provisions of the Rome 
Statute setting out the crimes—genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and aggression—or whether these 
guarantees apply to forms of criminal responsibility as well.  This 
Article takes the view, shared by others,38 that the forms of 
responsibility are part of the definition of the crime, at least for 
Article 22(2) purposes. 
33 See also GALLANT, supra note 4, at 359 (“In many systems, there is no binding 
requirement that the absolutely narrowest definition of crimes set forth in statutes, 
codes, or case law be adopted. The current system of international human rights law 
does not require this.”). 
34 Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND 
RESULTS 189, 194–95 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
35 Id. at 195. The prior PrepComm formulations did not specifically mention 
strict construction or construing ambiguities in favor of defendants. They included 
bracketed language providing: “[2. Conduct shall not be construed as criminal and 
sanctions shall not be applied under this statute by a process of analogy.]” Language 
from PrepComm, Intro and Draft Organization of Work, THE STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 244 (M. Cherif 
Bassiouni ed., 1998) [hereinafter PrepComm]. 
36 LEILA NADYJA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 182 
(2002) (“[M]any [states] were uncomfortable with a criminal court applying law that 
was uncodified.”). 
37 Id. at 182. 
38 See Sadat & Jolly, supra note 14, at 32–33 (proposing canons of construction 
for ICL and applying them to Article 25(3)’s forms of individual criminal 
responsibility, in particular the question whether Article 25(3) creates a hierarchy of 
responsibility and whether Article 25(3)(a) incorporates the “control of crime” theory 
of perpetration); see also Prosecutor v. Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgement 
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B. The Drafting of Article 22(2)
The drafters of the Rome Statute sought to accompany the
guarantee of strict construction with a more detailed 
international criminal code than seen at prior international 
criminal tribunals.  Consistent with the commitment to legality 
evinced in Article 22, during the negotiations of the Rome 
Statute, “[t]here was general agreement that the crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court should be defined with the clarity, 
precision and specificity required for criminal law in accordance 
with the principle of legality . . . .”39  However, there was a debate 
as to just how much clarity and precision was needed, as well as 
whether crimes should be defined explicitly in the statute or 
should incorporate by reference other international conventions,40 
and whether crime definitions ought to be exhaustive or 
illustrative.41  States also disagreed on whether it was necessary 
to elaborate on the elements of the crimes in the statute itself.42 
Ultimately, the Rome Statute fleshed out the definitions of 
crimes more than any prior international criminal instrument.43  
The statute “contains not only categories of offences, but also 
nearly exhaustively lists more than ninety crimes, which are 
supplemented by the Elements of Crimes,” and it sets out 
detailed procedural protections and “general principles of 
international criminal law,” which include “basic concepts and 
modes of individual criminal responsibility, requisite mental  
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute Concurring Opinion of Judge Wyngaert, ¶ 18 
n.27 (Dec. 18, 2012).
39 PrepComm, supra note 35, at 394.
40 Id. 
41 Id. (“Several delegations expressed a preference for an exhaustive rather then 
an illustrative definition of the crimes so as to ensure respect for the principle of 
legality,” while others advocated flexibility “to permit the continuing development of 
the law.”). 
42 Id. (explaining that some states felt it necessary to state the elements either 
“in the Statute or in an annex to provide the clarity and precision required for 
criminal law, to provide additional guidance to the Prosecution and the Court, to 
ensure respect for the rights of the accused and to avoid any political manipulation 
of the definitions”). 
43 Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1074–75 (“The statutes of the ICTY 
and . . . [ICTR] followed the basic Nuremberg model of listing bare bones offenses, 
with many of the core standards of culpability and punishment left unspecified.”). 
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elements, grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, and 
mistakes of fact and law.”44  It also offers a hierarchy of sources of 
law for judges to consult in interpreting the statute.45 
These crime definitions, the result of heated, political 
wrangling over a relatively short period of time,46 range from 
very specific to very vague.47  For example, the Rome Statute 
recognizes the war crime of “[e]mploying bullets which expand or 
flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard 
envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with 
incisions,” as well as the war crimes of “[c]ommitting outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment” and “cruel treatment.”48  The first is quite specific. 
The latter two are considerably less so.49  In some instances, 
crimes were defined more narrowly than under customary  
international law.  Sometimes, as in the crimes of extermination 
and torture, this divergence lowered the requirements of 
customary international law.50 
44 Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 552–53. Article 9 of the Rome 
Statute provides that the Elements of Crimes are to “assist the Court in the 
interpretation and application of [the articles defining the crimes]” and shall be 
adopted by a two-thirds majority of members of the Assembly of States Parties. 
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 9. 
45 See Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 553. 
46 SADAT, supra note 36, at 261; Shabtai Rosenne, Poor Drafting and Imperfect 
Organization: Flaws to Overcome in the Rome Statute, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 164, 167 
(2000). 
47 See William K. Lietzau, Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof: 
Structural Pillars for the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 477, 
483–84 (1999) (lamenting the vagueness of the Article 8’s war crime of “[w]ilfully 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health” and contending that 
“[o]ther examples of ambiguously or poorly defined offenses include ‘wounding 
treacherously,’ ‘attacking . . . buildings which are undefended,’ and ‘persecution,’ 
defined as ‘intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity’ ” and arguing 
that “[t]here is a manifest need to clarify the elements of these harms”). 
48 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(b)(xix), 8(b)(xxi), 8(c)(i). 
49 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, 
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 85 (2007) (explaining that the Rome Statute 
“contains some provisions that would seem to run afoul of the mandate of precision 
in legislative definition” including the crimes against humanity of other inhumane 
acts and the catch-all provision for sexual violence). 
50 Hunt, supra note 17, 66–67 (calling for ICC judges “rapidly to assert their 
ability to cure the deficiencies of the Court’s Statute, its Elements of Crimes and its 
rules of procedure and evidence which may be impermissibly prejudicial to the 
human rights of the accused”). 
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Compromise also led to ambiguous definitions of crimes, 
sometimes by design.51  Various commentators have referred to 
this phenomenon of the drafters’ leaving some language 
intentionally ambiguous in order to appease various disagreeing 
factions as “constructive ambiguity.”52  As discussed below, the 
term “gender” in the Rome Statute is an example of such 
constructive ambiguity.53 
C. The Context of Article 22: The Rome Statute’s Hierarchy of
Laws
Much as the Rome statute is far more specific in defining
crimes than the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals,54 particularly 
when read in conjunction with the Elements of Crimes, Article 21 
suggests that the drafters understood that there were still “areas 
for development” through consultation of treaties, principles, and 
rules of international law, as well as general principles of law 
derived from domestic systems.55  Recognizing its own 
incompleteness, the Rome Statute identifies and ranks sources of 
law.  The Rome Statute’s Article 21(1) states the “Court shall 
apply:” 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties
and the principles and rules of international law, including the
established principles of the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court
from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as
appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those
51 Id. at 67 (lamenting that the need for compromise despite political 
disagreement led to “recourse to the extraordinary concept of ‘creative ambiguity’ in 
the Statute, so as not to have to deal with an issue upon which agreement would 
have proved difficult if not impossible to obtain”); see also Lietzau, supra note 47, at 
484. 
52 See Hunt, supra note 17, at 67; see also Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition of 
“Gender” in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or 
Back for International Criminal Justice?, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 55, 57 (2005). 
53 See discussion infra notes 128–134. 
54 Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 552–53. 
55 FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 107–08. 
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principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with 
international law and internationally recognized norms and 
standards.56 
Finally, Article 21(3) demands that the “application and 
interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent 
with internationally recognized human rights” and also be 
nondiscriminatory.57 
The Rome Statute reigns supreme.  The Rome Statute 
indicates that, should the statute and Elements of Crimes 
conflict in any way, the statute prevails.58  Some commentators 
argue that the Elements of Crimes is merely persuasive and thus 
does not bind the court.59  Likewise, the court is only to turn to 
international law “in the second place” and “where appropriate.” 
Judges are to turn to general principles of national law, only 
“failing that” and “as appropriate,” as in, absent an answer in the 
statute, the Elements of Crimes, and international law. 
Judges have interpreted Article 21(2)’s inclusion of general 
principles of international law to include customary international 
law.60  Article 21 does not explicitly mention customary 
international law, which at least one commentator reads to mean 
56 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1). 
57 Id. at art. 21(3). More precisely, it must “be without any adverse distinction 
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, 
colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or 
social origin, wealth, birth or other status.” Id. 
58 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 9(3) and 51(5); see also Dapo Akande, 
Sources of International Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE § B, at 47 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009) (citing 
Articles 9(3) and 51(5)); Margaret deGuzman, Article 21, in COMMENTARY ON THE 
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 704 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d 
ed. 2008) (noting that “[a]n unfortunate inconsistency exists between the language of 
article 21 and that of article 9 concerning the role of the Elements of Crimes. Article 
21 mandates that the court ‘shall apply’ the Elements of Crimes whereas Article 9 
defines the purpose of the Elements as merely to ‘assist the Court in the 
interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, and 8,’ ” and proposing to resolve the 
conflict “by reading the two provisions together: the Court ‘shall apply’ the Elements 
for the purpose of ‘assisting the Court . . . .’ ”). 
59 See Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal 
Court: An Institutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 377, 413 n.194, 414 (2006) (stating that this view is the majority one) 
(citing Valerie Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: 
Advancing International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 627 (2004)). 
60 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 508–10 (Sept. 30, 2008). 
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that the states parties intended to eschew such inquiry.61  Most 
believe, however, that Article 21(1)(b)’s reference to “principles 
and rules of international law” and the “laws or customs of war” 
folds in customary international law.62 
So far, judges have applied customary international law as 
part of international law.  For example, the Katanga trial 
chamber stated: 
Where the founding texts do not specifically resolve a particular 
issue, the Chamber must refer to treaty or customary 
humanitarian law and the general principles of law.  To this 
end, the Chamber may, for example, be required to refer to the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and other courts on the 
matter.63 
Thus, judges who confront an ambiguity in ICC law must turn to 
international law, including customary international law, to 
resolve it.  This prompts many important questions:  How does a 
judge strictly construe a body of law that is based on an 
assessment of state practice and opinio juris (a sense of 
obligation)?64  What amounts to an ambiguity in customary 
international law?  One nonconforming state?  A majority of 
nonconforming states?  A lack of clarity over whether conforming 
states are guided by opinio juris?  Moreover, even if judges can 
decipher a customary international law norm, what role is the  
norm to play?  Does it merely assist judges to interpret the words 
of the Rome Statute or must customary international law provide 
support for the criminality of the conduct?65 
61 FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 222; cf. deGuzman, supra note 58, at 706–07 
(canvassing the possible meanings of general principles of international law and 
noting that it is unclear whether it meant to include customary international law). 
62 See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 58, at 706–07 (concluding that the drafters 
intended some role for customary international law); Wessel, supra note 59, at 415 
(arguing the Rome Statute privileges customary international law); Akande, supra 
note 58, § D, at 50 (noting that “[a]lthough [it is] listed as a source of applicable law 
in Art. 21(1)(b) [of the Rome Statute], custom is likely to play a less prominent role 
in that tribunal than in the ad hoc Tribunals” due to the Rome Statute and 
Elements of Crimes’ greater specificity on the “elements of each crime, the general 
principles of liability, and the applicable grounds for excluding responsibility”). 
63 Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ¶ 47 (emphasis added). 
64 See generally ILC CIL 1, supra note 18, ¶ 2. 
65 See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the risk of unfair surprise to 
defendants resulting from potential applications of customary international law to 
support criminality). 
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Article 21’s final source of law, general principles of domestic 
law, likewise complicates the strict construction picture. 
Professor Fletcher contends that Article 21(1)(c)’s invocation of 
“general principles of law derived from national laws of the legal 
systems of the world” renders interpretation of the Rome Statute 
a comparative law endeavor.66  Here too, there is the problem of 
identifying an ambiguity.  If ambiguity merely means 
inconsistent state practice, then ambiguities may be easy to come 
by. 
In a departure from the practice at the ad hoc tribunals, the 
court’s own case law is not binding on judges.67  Article 21(2) 
provides: “The Court may apply principles and rules of law as 
interpreted in its previous decisions.”68  May, not must.  In 
addition, the Rome Statute repeatedly flags that ICC decisions 
are not to be read to restrict the development of international law 
or ICL outside of the ICC.69  However, as Dapo Akande notes, 
judicial decisions nevertheless “play a deceptively important role 
in international law and ICL.”70  Akande explains that: 
In a system where much of the rules are unwritten, judges play 
the important role of determining precisely what the law is. 
They assess the extent to which state practice and opinio juris 
support an alleged rule of customary law.  They also decide on 
what the general principles of law are.71 
Moreover, binding or not, previous decisions give judges in future 
cases a default template that is likely to inform their analysis.72 
Although the Rome Statute does not explicitly mention the 
Vienna Convention and scholars disagree on the appropriateness 
of relying on the Vienna Convention in interpreting the Rome 
66 FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 222. 
67 This rejection of stare decisis is consistent, however, with the practice of the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). 
68 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(2). 
69 Id. at art. 10 (“Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or 
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes 
other than this Statute.”); id. at art. 22(3) (“This article shall not affect the 
characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law independently 
of this Statute.”). 
70 Akande, supra note 58, § F, at 53. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. (“Once those customary rules or general principles are identified through 
a process of judicial reasoning, they provide an ‘off the shelf’ assessment of the law 
which is often the starting point for deciding future cases. The onus is then on those 
who assert that the law is different to provide their own different assessment of the 
evidence.”). 
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Statute,73 the Vienna Convention is yet another source of 
guidance to which ICC judges may turn in interpreting crime 
definitions.  ICC judges already have invoked the principles of 
the Vienna Convention in interpreting the Rome Statute,74 in 
particular the basic or “general rule”75 of the Vienna Convention. 
The general rule provides:  “A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.”76  This rule is part of a framework made up of 
“several integrated parts that are collectively designed to 
determine the meaning of a treaty provision under 
interpretation, and it is generally recognized as reflecting 
customary international law.”77  The Vienna Convention permits, 
73 See Jacobs, supra note 18, at 30–31 (arguing that judges should not rely on 
the Vienna Convention in interpreting the quasi-statutory aspects of the Rome 
Statute); Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 557 n.86; Sadat & Jolly, supra 
note 14, at 759–61 (noting that, due to the quasi-constitutional and legislative 
aspects of parts of the Rome Statute, “traditional interpretative methodologies 
(including a straightforward application of the Vienna Convention . . . ) do not fit 
neatly with the unique characteristics of the Rome Statute”); deGuzman, supra note 
58, at 705 (noting that the “delegates debated whether the VCLT [Vienna 
Convention] and the [CAT] [we]re applicable or merely relevant”). 
74 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07, Judgement Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 43 (Mar. 7, 2014) (“To interpret the relevant provisions of 
the Statute and the Elements of Crimes, the Chamber must draw on the method of 
interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘the 
Vienna Convention’), specifically articles 31 and 32. The chambers of the Court have 
unanimously and systematically based their interpretation of the Statute on the 
principles established by the Vienna Convention”) (citing various appeals ICC 
chamber and pre-trial Chamber decisions). 
75 Id. ¶ 44–45 (noting that the Vienna Convention sets forth “one general rule of 
interpretation (“the General Rule”) and one alone . . . . This method of interpretation 
prescribes that the various ingredients—the ordinary meaning, the context, and the 
object and purpose—be considered together in good faith.”). The General Rule, which 
therefore refers to a holistic approach, does not establish any hierarchical or 
chronological order in which those various ingredients are to be examined and then 
applied. 
76 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
77 Anne-Marie Carstens, Interpreting Transplanted Treaty Rules, in 
INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 235 (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds. 2015) 
(discussing the applicability of the Vienna Convention to international legal norms 
transplanted from one legal regime to another). Cf. Duncan Hollis, The Existential 
Function of Interpretation in International Law, in INTERPRETATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds. 2015) (commenting that “[t]he 
treaty’s centrality to existing interpretative inquiries has not, however, translated 
into certainty or consensus on treaty interpretation itself. . . . [D]ebate continues 
over (i) their legal status, (ii) the interpretative method(s) and techniques they 
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among other things, the consultation of travaux préparatoires 
(essentially, drafting history for treaties) to do away with 
ambiguities in a treaty.78 
Perhaps the most controversial issue with international 
criminal judges’ reliance on the Vienna Convention is the latter’s 
mandate to consider the terms of a treaty in light of the treaty’s 
“object and purpose.”79  Several commentators have noted that 
this teleological approach arguably conflicts with legality 
generally and Article 22(2)’s command of strict construction 
specifically.80  As will be discussed below, international courts 
have employed the Vienna Convention’s teleological inquiry to  
interpret international instruments other than the Rome 
Statute, such as international humanitarian law (“IHL”) treaties, 
to assist them in interpreting or, sometimes, defining crimes. 
What, then, is strict construction in a regime of manifold 
sources of law, combined with teleological interpretive techniques 
that push for broader interpretation?  Before attempting to  
privilege, and (iii) the boundaries they set in defining what constitutes 
interpretation”). 
78 Article 32, on Supplementary Means of Interpretation, provides: “Recourse 
may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the 
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning 
when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous 
or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 
see also Julian D. Mortenson, The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention 
Hostile to Drafting History, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 780, 781 (2013) (arguing that the 
drafters of the Vienna Convention “repeatedly reiterated that any serious effort to 
understand a treaty should rely on a careful and textually grounded resort to 
travaux, without embarrassment or apology”). 
79 Robinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 15, at 934; Jacobs, supra note 18, at 33. 
80 See, e.g., Akande, supra note 58, § 3(A), at 44 (noting that the Vienna 
Convention’s instruction to turn to the travaux préparatoires and object and 
purposes “might lead to a temptation to construe ambiguous provisions more 
liberally than might appear from simple textual interpretation,” contrary to the in 
dubio pro reo or strict construction principle); see also Grover, A Call to Arms, supra 
note 14, at 557 (“If legality is recognized as the guiding principle for interpreting 
crimes in the Court’s jurisdiction, it would require the textual approach to prevail 
over competing intent as well as object and purpose based approaches to applying 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. This means, quite simply, textual primacy. 
Considerations of context, object, and purpose as well as interpretive aids such as 
the Elements of Crimes and travaux préparatoires cannot be invoked 
inappropriately to broaden, modify, or override the plain meaning of these Articles. 
The same is true of normative arguments about the importance of protecting victims 
of crimes or giving effect to the Court’s jurisdiction to end impunity.”). 
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answer this question, the next Part discusses the justifications 
for strict construction and evaluates their applicability to the 
world of international criminal justice. 
II. PURPOSES OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION
This Part seeks to understand the purpose of Article 22’s 
guarantee of strict construction.81  The traditional justifications 
for strict construction of criminal statutes are notice and 
separation of powers—or legislative supremacy.82  Building on 
these traditional grounds, commentators have justified the rule 
based on democratic accountability, avoiding arbitrary law 
enforcement, efficiency, and eliciting legislative preference.  In 
the context of the ICC, one may add to this list the goals of 
promoting respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the 
protection of state sovereignty.  This Part evaluates the strength 
of these justifications and also flags the drawbacks of too strict a 
strict construction regime. 
A. Traditional Justifications for Strict Construction
1. Notice
One argument in support of strict construction is rooted in a
concern about individual freedom and notice:  “[C]itizens have a 
right to be warned in advance about the risk that their conduct 
will run afoul of the criminal law.”83  As Justice Holmes stated in 
McBoyle: 
81 Just like the ICC, it turns to domestic scholarship to elucidate this question. 
For example, the Lubanga trial chamber has supported inquiry into domestic legal 
doctrines to help guide courts to a better informed and reasoned interpretation. 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Judgement on the Appeal of 
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against His Conviction, ¶ 470 (Dec. 1, 2014) (“[T]he 
Appeals Chamber considers it appropriate to seek guidance from approaches 
developed in other jurisdictions in order to reach a coherent and persuasive 
interpretation of the Court’s legal texts. This Court is not administrating justice in a 
vacuum, but, in applying the law, needs to be aware of and can relate to concepts 
and ideas found in domestic jurisdictions.”). 
82 FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 81; Price, supra note 25, at 907–12 (debunking 
notice and legislative supremacy arguments and arguing that democratic 
accountability is a better justification for lenity); Jeffries, supra note 22, at 201–12 
(debunking these grounds and the argument based on the “rule of law”). 
83 FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 81; see also Bruce Broomhall, Article 22: Nullum 
crimen sine lege, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 949, 953 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed., 2016) (“As a 
principle of interpretation, nullum crimen aims to limit the power of the (unelected) 
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Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider 
the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable 
that a fair warning should be given to the world in language 
that the common world will understand, of what the law intends 
to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far 
as possible, the line should be clear.84 
As Professor Solan notes, “[D]ue process concerns . . . arise when 
a court breaks new ground by interpreting a statute or regulation 
broadly for the first time in the context of a prosecution.”85  At 
least one ICC judge, Christine Van den Wyngaert, has invoked 
the notice and rule of law arguments in favor of strict 
construction.86 
Many question notice as a sufficient justification for strict 
construction.87  They acknowledge that the notice argument may 
make some sense for regulatory offenses, where someone could 
genuinely be caught off guard by a broader interpretation of a 
judiciary to interfere with liberty beyond the extent that a reasonable individual 
could understand from the words of the relevant prohibition. Just as legal subjects 
are presumed capable of knowing and have a duty to obey the law, so too is the 
lawmaker responsible for making the law clear and ascertainable, while the 
judiciary is obliged in principle to refrain from penalizing conduct not made criminal 
by the legislator through the wording of the law in question, and is thus confined to 
interpreting and applying, but not making the law.”); Price, supra note 25, at 907 
(“The theory here is that narrow construction protects citizens from being caught off 
guard by broader prohibitions than they could anticipate”); GROVER, INTERPRETING 
CRIMES, supra note 14, at 137. 
84 Price, supra note 25, at 907 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 
27 (1931)). 
85 Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2209, 2263 (2003). 
86 Prosecutor v. Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Concurring Opinion of Judge 
Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 20 (Dec. 18, 2012) (arguing that “[i]ndividuals must have been 
in a position to know at the time of engaging in certain conduct that the law 
criminalised it” and noting that “[t]he Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights has given considerable weight to the elements of ‘accessibility’ and 
‘foreseeability’ in its assessment of the legality principle”); see also Achour v. France, 
2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 249, 264 (2006) (“It follows [from Article 7 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights] that offences and the relevant penalties must be 
clearly defined by law. This requirement is satisfied where the individual can know 
from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the 
courts' interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him criminally 
liable”); Kononov v. Latvia, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 35, 106–07 (2010). 
87 The Supreme Court: 2007 Term Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 481 
n.65 (2008) [hereinafter The Rule of Lenity] (noting that “[s]ome argue that notice is
largely a pretextual justification for the rule of lenity”).
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criminal statute.88  However, for malum in se (innately 
immoral)89 offenses, this justification is weak, because it is very 
unlikely anyone thinks what they are doing is legal.90 
The notice argument seems, at first blush, especially weak in 
the context of grave international crimes.  After all, most 
international crimes are malum in se.  As Professor Fletcher has 
explained: “The definitions of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity appeal to shared norms of moral 
wrongdoing.”91  Fletcher notes the malum in se nature of the 
crimes in turn affects the lack of specificity of the crimes:  “The 
evils are so obvious that the drafters use catchall provisions that 
rely explicitly on moral judgment.”92  Under this view of ICL, 
notice may not justify strict construction at the ICC.93 
Perhaps the more fundamental critique of the notice 
justification is that it relies on the “fiction” that criminals are 
reading up on the law.94  Even for regulatory offenses though, 
some commentators question the notice justification, given that 
the law often seems indifferent to notice, as demonstrated by the 
flimsy and formal conception of notice that exists.95  Publication 
of a statute is enough.  Moreover, the necessary clarity in the 
statute need not come from the text of the statute itself; a judicial 
decision interpreting it suffices.96  Courts do not require that the  
88 However, as Price notes, it could cut the other way, too. Price, supra note 25, 
at 908 (“Though it may be true that technical regulatory statutes are less intuitive 
than core offenses, they are also one type of criminal law that defendants may 
actually read. Certainly participants in regulated industries have only themselves to 
blame if they fail to seek counsel’s advice about the potential breadth of 
regulations.”). 
89 See Malum in se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
90 Price, supra note 25, at 908 (“[N]otice concerns . . . [do not apply] when crimes 
fall deep within . . . societal prohibition”); see also FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 82; 
see also Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1105 (arguing that the fair notice arguments 
supporting legality norms apply in less force to international prosecutions for 
“manifestly wrongful” conduct). 
91 FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 31. 
92 Id. (citing the example of “the crime against humanity is based on ‘rape, 
sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, or any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’ ”). 
93 Id. (“In the field of offenses malum in se, lawyers and judges can typically rely 
on their moral intuitions to decide what is lawful and what is not.”). 
94 Price, supra note 25, at 907. 
95 Jeffries, supra note 22, at 207. 
96 Id. at 207–08. 
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person in fact be on notice of the law, but merely require that the 
law exist such that, with a lawyer and some diligence, a person 
could have discovered the law.97 
The procedures of the ICC seem to affirm this argument that 
notice is a low priority at the ICC.  Regulation 55, a judge-made 
regulation, permits courts to change the legal characterization of 
the charges.98  In Katanga, the judges permitted 
recharacterization of the charges even after the defendant had 
rested his case.99  This civil law style regulation is premised on 
the notion that defendants need notice of the factual allegations 
against them, but not of the legal characterization of those 
facts.100 
Still, the argument for notice as a basis for strict 
construction at the ICC may be stronger than it first appears. 
Arguably, not all crimes in the Rome Statute are malum in se, 
but rather malum prohibitum (wrong because it is prohibited) 
such as the war crime of transferring the civilian population by 
an occupying power101 and various child soldiering offenses.102  As 
Fletcher argues, “There may be precise rules governing the 
conduct of warfare, but they are not always morally obvious, and 
for that reason it is better to think of them as a function of 
legislative prohibition, or malum prohibitum.”103  Moreover, 
97 Id. at 208. 
98 See generally WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, REGULATION 55 AND THE 
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Am. Univ. Wash. 
Coll. of Law Legal Analysis and Educ. Project ed., 2013); Carsten Stahn, 
Modification of the Legal Characterization of Facts in the ICC System: A Portrayal of 
Regulation 55, 16 CRIM. L. F. 1 (2005); Sophie Rigney, ‘The Words Don’t Fit You’: 
Recharacterisation of the Charges, Trial Fairness, and Katanga, 15 MELB. J. INT’L L. 
515 (2014). 
99 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the 
Charges Against the Accused Persons, ¶¶ 17–20 (Nov. 21, 2012). 
100 See id. 
101 FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 31–32; see also David Luban, Fairness to 
Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, 
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 585 (Samantha Besson & John 
Tasioulas eds., 2010) (arguing that the legality principle is less important in ICL 
than in domestic criminal law). 
102 See generally MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY (2014) (arguing that situation of child soldiers is 
more nuanced than ICL would like to portray it to be). 
103 FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 31–32; cf. Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and 
the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400, 
1405 (2009) (questioning whether all international crimes are grave). 
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“even as to obviously immoral conduct there might be borderline 
cases, and ideally courts should not have the discretion to act 
arbitrarily in these cases.”104 
Notice may be a more realistic possibility in ICL than in 
domestic jurisdictions.  In domestic jurisdictions, most would-be 
criminals are unlikely to be poring over statutes and court 
decisions or have lawyers on retainer to do so for them; whereas, 
many, if not most, of the world’s militaries provide training in 
IHL, which folds into ICL.  Concededly, international criminal 
defendants may be civilians or combatants belonging to a rebel 
group that does not provide training of this sort, so this 
argument may not apply in equal force to all defendants. 
2. Separation of Powers
The other traditional rationale for strict construction is
separation of powers.  As Justice Marshall stated in Wiltberger:  
“It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, 
and ordain its punishment.”105  The separation of powers 
argument is rooted partly in democratic notions that a legislature 
elected by the people should make law and partly in an 
assumption of legislative superiority in the area of lawmaking.106 
The separation of powers argument is rather weak in the 
international context, because there is no international 
legislature at the ready to fix mistakes or patch holes in the 
law.107  The Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”), a body with one 
representative from each state party, is the closest analog to a 
legislature the ICC has, but it meets infrequently and is not 
charged with legislating.108 
104 FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 82. 
105 Price, supra note 25, at 909 (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 
95 (1820)). 
106 Ofer Raban, Is Textualism Required by Constitutional Separation of Powers?, 
49 LOY. OF L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5, 19), http://ssrn.com/abs 
tract=2735047. 
107 Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 137 (“Complicating efforts to create a holistic 
corpus of law is the fact that the international system lacks a standing world 
legislature that can fill interstices and lacuna, modernize ancient prohibitions, or fix 
faulty formulations”); see also Darryl Robinson, International Criminal Law as 
Justice, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 699, 706 (2013) [hereinafter Robinson, ICL as 
Justice]. 
108 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 122. 
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Also, any assumption that ASP “legislation,” even if it were 
to occur, is superior to judicial resolution of an issue is highly 
questionable.  The negotiations over the definitions of the crimes 
in the Rome Statute were difficult and fraught with politics109 
and sometimes yielded “lowest common denominator” crime 
definitions.110  There is little reason to think that future attempts 
at refining the definitions of crimes through agreement of states 
parties would be easier or better, even if the occasion presented 
itself.  
An even bigger strike against the separation of powers 
argument is delegation.  As one U.S. commentator has argued of 
the lenity canon: “[d]elegated criminal lawmaking and [strict 
construction] cannot peacefully coexist.”111  Strict construction 
only protects legislative supremacy if the legislature did not 
intend to delegate lawmaking authority to the courts or, at least, 
to permit courts to fill in blanks as they appear in new and  
unforeseen factual circumstances.112  The separation of powers 
argument is weak where it seems the legislature intended to 
delegate lawmaking authority by using broad language.113 
109 SADAT, supra note 36, at 261 (arguing that “the codification process was 
fated to produce a text that represented a set of political compromises, rather than a 
new set of progressive norms criminalizing behavior on a broad scale”); see id. at 266 
(“[P]rep comm struggled enormously with the task of defining crimes”) (citing Report 
of Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. 
GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. 22, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc A/50/22 (Dec. 12, 1995)). See generally 
Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 443, 444, n.7 (1999); Rosenne, 
supra note 46, at 167–72. 
110 SADAT, supra note 36, at 267. 
111 Kahan, supra note 25, at 347. 
112 Jeffries, supra note 22, at 204 (“[W]here the statute is ambiguous or 
inconsistent, separation of powers provides no sure guide. In this frame of reference, 
strict construction is required only if the legislature commands that approach. If, as 
is usual, the legislature does not speak to that question or specifies a rule of ‘fair 
construction,’ interstitial judicial lawmaking is at least tolerated and perhaps 
affirmatively authorized. More to the point, it is inevitable. Any resolution of 
statutory ambiguity involves judicial choice. The resulting ‘gloss’ on the legislative 
text is both politically legitimate and institutionally unavoidable.”); Kahan, supra 
note 25, at 347 (arguing that the underenforcement of strict construction, at least in 
the context of U.S. federal courts, demonstrates the delegation of criminal 
lawmaking power to courts). 
113 Solan, supra note 85, at 2261 (arguing that dynamic statutory interpretation 
“does not offend . . . fair play” in criminal cases where the statute has broad 
language). 
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States delegate lawmaking power to international courts in 
part for efficiency reasons.114  Discussing judicial lawmaking at 
international courts generally, Tom Ginsburg has explained: 
“judicial lawmaking serves an interest of the parties in reducing 
transaction costs of negotiating the details of a treaty.”115  Often, 
“[w]hen states are unsure about the precise type of issue that will 
arise, . . . they will implicitly empower the tribunal to resolve 
disputes and clarify conventions.”116  At the ICC, the negotiations 
were heated and difficult, not to mention, many years in the 
making.117  Attempts to amend the statute would likely be 
equally so, as suggested by the challenging and ultimately still 
incomplete efforts at defining and explaining the court’s 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.118 
States often delegate lawmaking for reasons other than 
efficiency.  They may “believe that issues of law are best clarified 
in the context of actual cases.”119  Indeed, judicial expansion of a 
criminal prohibition sometimes may be a good thing:  “[I]t is one 
114 American scholars have noted the relationship between lenity and efficiency. 
Efficiency concerns are sometimes offered as a justification for strict construction. 
Kahan, supra note 25, at 349 n.15; see also Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUDS. 257, 262–63 (1974) 
(weighing the benefits and transaction costs of up-front identification of the rule 
compared to an after-the-fact clarification of the rule by courts). 
115 Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 
VA. J. INT'L L. 631, 644 (2005). 
116 Id. (“This discussion assumes, however, that the third party acts as an 
effective agent of the parties and does not impose its own preferences on them. This 
is the familiar problem of principal and agent, and will likely affect the parties’ 
willingness to designate any third party to resolve disputes. We ought to expect 
states party to a treaty to designate third parties to interpret the agreement when 
the expected policy losses resulting from the agency problem are outweighed by the 
joint benefits to the parties from enhanced coordination.”); see also Allison Marston 
Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast 
the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 44–46 (2006) (discussing the possibility that 
the ICTY was a rogue agent). 
117 See generally Rosenne, supra note 46, at 167–72 (criticizing the process of 
drafting the Rome Statute and noting problems with the resulting statute). 
118 The Rome Statute indicated that the court would have jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression, but put in a placeholder for the crime until states could define 
the crime and the nature of the court’s jurisdiction over it. States negotiated a 
definition at the Kampala conference, but some very critical questions remain to be 
resolved. See generally Beth Van Schaack, The Aggression Amendments: Points of 
Consensus and Dissension, 105 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 105TH ANN. MEETING OF THE 
SOC’Y INT’L L. 154 (2011). 
119 Ginsburg, supra note 115, at 644; see also Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 
14, at 554 (“[S]ome vagueness is inevitable to avoid ‘excessive rigidity and to keep 
pace with changing circumstances.’ ”). 
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means by which the legal system responds to new ways of 
disobeying social norms.”120  States may also delegate to save face 
domestically:  “[V]agueness may allow treaty parties to claim the 
text means different things to their respective domestic 
constituencies.”121  They may also do so to hedge their bets on 
whether a particular interpretation favors their interests down 
the road.122  Thus, “states will sometimes leave details vague, in 
which case international adjudicators become delegated 
lawmakers.”123 
States parties to the Rome Statute clearly intended to 
delegate at least some lawmaking power to the court,124 
apparently for many of the reasons Ginsburg identifies.  Many 
provisions are so vague that it seems obvious that the states 
parties intended the judges to flesh out the nuances of the rule on 
a case-by-case basis.125  The negotiations of the Rome Statute also 
reveal that many states parties assumed that the courts would 
fill in some blanks in the law.126  Others have noted the desire to 
allow the court to address new and varied forms of wrongdoing.127 
The concept of gender in the Rome Statute is illustrative. 
The word “gender” appears several times throughout the Rome 
Statute,128 including in the definition of the crimes against 
120 Solan, supra note 85, at 2260–61 (noting federal courts’ rejection of common 
law crimes early in American history, but arguing that “there seem to be 
circumstances in which the dynamic interpretation of criminal statutes does not 
offend the values of legislative primacy or fair play,” most obviously, where “the 
legislature uses broad words in the statute”). 
121 Ginsburg, supra note 115, at 644. 
122 Id. (“Leaving treaties vague may also make sense when parties are unsure 
which side of a future dispute they will be on and want to reserve the right to argue 
for different positions of law at a later date.”). 
123 Id. 
124 See Danner, supra note 116, at 48. 
125 Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 124–25 (describing ICL’s common-law-style 
evolution). 
126 Wessel, supra note 59, at 386 (“[S]ome delegates to the ICC’s Preparatory 
Commission argued that problems arising from ambiguity in the treaty would be 
naturally addressed by the bench.”); see also Lietzau, supra note 47, at 482 (“[M]any 
delegations sought open-ended elements in order to expand the discretion of the 
Court. These states envisioned a Court that would not only adjudicate criminal 
cases, but also could define the law and thus foster its evolution.”). 
127 Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 554. 
128 Oosterveld, supra note 52, at 57 (noting that the Rome Statute uses the word 
gender nine times). 
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humanity of persecution.129  Controversially, in the Article on 
crimes against humanity, the term “gender” is defined.  It is 
controversial both in that the drafters defined it, since many  
other terms are undefined, and for the definition that the 
drafters decided upon.130  Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute 
provides: 
For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term 
‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the 
context of society.  The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any 
meaning different from the above. 
Many have criticized the definition for failing to take into 
account more modern thinking on gender, captured in a number 
of other United Nations documents,131 particularly the notion 
that gender is a socially constructed concept and is not 
synonymous with sex.132 
A leading commentator on ICL and gender, Valerie 
Oosterveld contends that the definition of gender in the Rome 
Statute is an example of “constructive ambiguity.”133  The 
drafters left it intentionally ambiguous, through the apparently 
competing language of “male and female” and “within the context 
of society,” so that an agreement on the Rome Statute could be 
reached between conservative states, particularly the Vatican 
and Islamic countries, who would not agree to the more fluid 
formulation of gender, and more progressive states.  Each side 
could claim that its interpretation prevailed.134 
A tweak on the separation of powers argument is the notion 
of lenity as a tool for eliciting legislative preference.135  This 
theory may resonate in the domestic criminal context, 
129 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h) (“Persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”). 
130 Some commentators have argued that the defining of gender indicated a 
desire to cabin or minimize it. Oosterveld, supra note 52, at 57. 
131 Id. at 67–71. 
132 Id. at 71–79. 
133 Id. at 57–58. 
134 See also SADAT, supra note 36, at 160 (noting “[t]he beauty, and the 
difficulty, of the compromise language employed is that while it was crafted to 
appease two irreconcilable points of view, both sides may assert that the definition 
as adopted reflects their understanding of the term”). 
135 See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2162, 2196–97 (2002).
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particularly in the United States.  Since the crime control and 
law enforcement lobbies are more powerful than criminals, 
alleged criminals, or the criminal defense lobby, strict 
construction puts the onus on the side more likely to elicit a 
legislative response if the court gets it wrong.136  Justice Scalia 
seemed to view strict construction in this way as well.  He has 
explained that lenity “places the weight of inertia upon the party 
that can best induce Congress to speak more clearly and keeps 
courts from making criminal law in Congress’s stead.”137 
The preference-eliciting argument, if anything, cuts against 
strict construction at the ICC.  Any legislative response is 
unlikely.  To amend the Rome Statute or the Elements of Crimes, 
a two-thirds vote of the assembly of states parties, which meets 
yearly unless by special arrangement, is needed.138  Moreover, 
unlike in domestic jurisdictions, it is also not clear whether the 
Assembly of States Parties would be more likely to respond to 
unduly narrow readings of the law or unduly broad ones.  States, 
protective of their sovereignty and their own officials, may be 
more likely to restrict liability where they view the courts to have 
gone too far than to enact more crimes to cover conduct that 
judges have excluded from a legal prohibition under the rule of 
strict construction. 
3. Limiting Arbitrary Enforcement of Criminal Law
Limiting arbitrariness in the enforcement of the law is
another oft-cited justification for strict construction.139  A robust 
lenity doctrine reduces prosecutorial discretion and thus the 
possibility for arbitrary enforcement.140  In domestic jurisdictions, 
136 See id. at 2166, 2196–06 (discussing lenity as an example of his theory of 
preference-eliciting canons of construction). 
137 See The Rule of Lenity, supra note 87, at 477 (quoting United States v. 
Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008)); see also Elhauge, supra note 135, at 2196. 
138 Article 121 on Amendments provides that the Assembly of States Parties 
may decide to take up a proposal for an Amendment by a majority vote and may 
amend the statute by a two-thirds vote; amendments apply only to states that have 
agreed to them. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(5). 
139 Cf. Luban, supra note 101, 15–16 (stating that the two main arguments for 
the principle of legality are notice and preventing arbitrary enforcement). In her 
separate opinion in Ngudolo, Judge Van den Wyngaert made the related argument 
that strict construction “is an essential safeguard to ensure both the necessary 
predictability and legal certainty that are essential for a system that is based on the 
rule of law.” Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Concurring Opinion 
of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 19 (Dec. 18, 2012). 
140 Price, supra note 25, at 910–11. 
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the chief benefit may be a reduction in arbitrary or even 
discriminatory enforcement by police.141  The ICC has no police 
force, so this concern about arbitrary police action is absent or at 
least greatly reduced. 
Despite the lack of a police force, the concern over arbitrary 
or politically-driven prosecutions is very much present at the 
ICC.  One of the United States’ chief reservations about the ICC 
is the possibility for politically motivated prosecutions of 
American soldiers or officials.142  The withdrawal of African 
states from the ICC based in part on the perception that the ICC 
prosecutor was discriminating against Africa—all of the ICC’s 
cases are against African defendants—confirms that the worry 
over selective and arbitrary enforcement is alive.143 
This concern about arbitrary enforcement by the ICC 
prosecution is overblown, at least on the basis of ambiguities and 
vagueness of laws.  The Rome Statute, in fact, ties the hands of 
the ICC prosecutor far more than domestic jurisdictions do 
theirs.  The prosecutor must get approval from the Pretrial 
Chamber to launch an investigation into a situation, to issue 
arrest warrants, and to confirm charges against defendants.144  
Moreover, as Luban has explained, “there is simply much less  
141 In a variation of this argument, Zachary Price contends that lenity is best 
viewed as a means of ensuring transparency and political accountability in the 
expansion of criminal law. Lenity, he argues, forces legislators to be more 
transparent, makes for more specific and considered rules, and increases the chance 
of political resistance to overreaching. Id. at 911; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 
413–14 (1991) (arguing that lenity “serves the representation-reinforcing goal of 
protecting a relatively powerless group (people accused of committing crimes) and 
the normativist goal of injecting due process values of notice, fairness, and 
proportionality into the political process”). As discussed above, it is far from clear 
that ASP negotiations are more transparent than ICC decisions. Moreover, in the 
ICC context, unlike in domestic jurisdictions, political resistance to crime expansion 
is not in short supply. See discussion supra note 36 and accompanying text. States 
have a number of ways of expressing political resistance, including withdrawing 
from the court. See Wessel, supra note 59, at 382. 
142 John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal 
Court from America’s Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 186, 189 (2000). 
143 See Sewell Chan & Marlise Simons, South Africa to Withdraw from 
International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/10/22/world/africa/south-africa-international-criminal-court.html?_r=0 (noting 
the argument of some African leaders that the ICC is “an instrument of modern 
colonialism”). 
144 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(3). 
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danger of government abuse in ICL then in domestic legal 
systems, because ICL arises from weak, decentralized 
institutions rather than strong, concentrated ones.”145 
The risk of arbitrary enforcement by judges at the ICC is 
likewise low, but not nonexistent.  As Jeffries has explained, with 
judges, “[t]he risk involved is that judicial particularization of the 
broad rubrics of common-law authority will be too ‘subjective,’ too 
closely grounded in the facts of the case at hand, insufficiently 
abstracted from the personal characteristics of the individual 
defendant.”146  There is something to this concern in the 
international criminal context.  In attempts to define 
international crimes, judges have sometimes blurred the line 
between describing the facts of the case at hand and the 
definition of the crime.147 
Nevertheless, as Jeffries—and Herbert Packer before him—
have argued, the judicial process places checks on judges that 
will constrain abuses, in particular “reasoned elaboration.”148  
Packer explained that “[t]he fact that courts operate in the open 
according to a system of reasoning that is subjected to the 
scrutiny of an interested audience, both professional and lay, 
militates against any but the most marginal invasions of the 
values represented by the principle of legality.”149  This 
constraint is very much in operation at the ICC.  Far more than 
domestic judges, at least at the trial level, ICC judges engage in 
lengthy discussion of their legal reasoning in published opinions 
that are available on the Internet.  In ICL, it is hard to hide the 
ball on judicial overreaches. 
Jeffries and Packer also note that the common law method of 
analogical reasoning, meaning “relat[ing] the particular bad 
thing that this man did to other bad things that have been 
treated as criminal in the past,” is a substantial impediment to 
145 Luban, supra note 101, at 119. 
146 Jeffries, supra note 22, at 214. 
147 Caroline Davidson, Explaining Inhumanity: The Use of Crime-Definition 
Experts at International Criminal Courts, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 359, 370 
(2015) (discussing judges’ reliance on expert witness testimony about forced 
marriage and child soldiers at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the ICC, 
respectively, to help define the crimes). 
148 Jeffries, supra note 22, at 214. 
149 Id. at 215 (quoting HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION, 88 
(1968)). 
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arbitrary decision-making.150  If it is taken literally, this 
argument is hard to reconcile with Article 22(2)’s bar on defining 
crimes by analogy.  However, a weaker, and more sensible, 
notion of the bar on analogical reasoning—which merely 
prohibits judges from reading into a statute conduct that the 
legislature contemplated and chose not to include151—would still 
allow for analogical reasoning in interpretation of crimes. 
B. Potential Justifications for Strict Construction at the ICC
As the discussion above indicates, some of the justifications
for strict construction that apply in domestic jurisdictions, such 
as notice, and avoiding arbitrariness, apply more readily than 
one might think at the ICC.  Others, such as separation of 
powers, eliciting legislative preference, and efficiency are quite 
weak.  This Part explores additional justifications for strict 
construction at the ICC. 
1. Promoting Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and the
Perceived Legitimacy of the ICC
Arguably, the ICC’s need to promote human rights through
exemplary criminal trials justifies a fairly strict version of strict 
construction.  Many have endorsed the expressive function of 
ICL.152  Strict construction is arguably an important piece of this 
expressive function—to show the world that even with the worst 
of crimes, there must be strict adherence to legality principle. 
Larry May, for example, has argued that: 
[o]ne of the most important limitations is that we respect the
international rule of law and not merely prosecute on the basis
of our heartfelt moral outrage in the face of mass atrocities . . . . 
If we limit our scope, we will have a better chance of defending 
international trials for the most egregious of human rights 
abuses.153 
150 Id. at 214–15 (quoting HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL 
SANCTION, 88 (1968)); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993) (defending analogical reasoning). 
151 See discussion supra note 28. 
152 MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
153 LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE 341 (2008) 
(advocating a “limited scope for international trials”). 
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If judges adhere strictly to the definitions set out in the Rome 
Statute and thus do not legislate from the bench, it may also help 
to legitimize the court and the court’s decisions in the eyes of 
states.154  The ICC, while on firmer footing than it was fifteen 
years ago, is not immune to attacks on its legitimacy.155 
However, the expressive argument may cancel itself out.  An 
extremely strict regime of strict construction, whereby little or no 
leeway is given to courts for interpretation or application of the 
law to new facts, may indeed be the most rigorous version of the 
legality principle in the realm of interpretation, but the 
expressive costs on other fronts may be quite high.  Courts may 
be unduly limited in their abilities to express other human rights 
values—such as the condemnation of gross human rights or IHL 
violations—due to rigid interpretation.  As former ICTY Judge 
Hunt stated in condemning the positivist trend of the Rome 
Statute: “[i]f it is to fulfill its goals efficiently, international 
criminal law must be given space to grow, rather than kept in a 
straightjacket imposed by a rigid code.”156  This argument is  
strengthened by the uncertain status of the Article 22(2) 
interpretive rules in international human rights law and 
inconsistent state practice.157 
Further, if judges are too strict on lenity—the requirement 
that ambiguity in crime definitions be construed in the 
defendant’s favor—there is a risk of making matters worse from 
a legality and transparency perspective.  Prosecutors will avoid 
arguably ambiguous provisions, which would be interpreted in 
the narrowest light possible, in favor of vague ones, rather than 
giving the court the opportunity to clarify the more specific but 
154 See Robert Cryer, The Ad Hoc Tribunals and the Law of Command 
Responsibility, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS 163 (Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 2010) (“[T]he judges of the 
ICTY know very well that their ability to affect the law is related to the extent to 
which they can convince states that their interpretation of the law is acceptable.”). 
Lietzau, supra note 47, at 482 (decrying the preference of “many delegations [to the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute]” for “open-ended elements in order to expand the 
discretion of the Court” to “define the law and thus foster its evolution,” and arguing 
that “judicial activism of this nature conflicts with the most fundamental principles 
of criminal law”). 
155 MAY, supra note 153, at 335 (“In my view, the International Criminal Court 
needs to gain widespread acceptance, especially in non-Western countries, to best 
thwart the specter of political leaders in the dock continuously indicting the ICC 
itself instead of being forced to respond to the evidence of their putative misdeeds.”). 
156 Hunt, supra note 17, at 59. 
157 See discussion supra notes 32 and 33. 
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ambiguous law.  This shift in charging practice may stymie the 
development of ICL and lead to retrograde definitions of crimes 
on issues where attitudes are shifting or have shifted since the 
drafting of the Rome Statute. 
2. Protecting State Sovereignty
At the ICC, strict construction may be better understood as a
doctrine that protects state sovereignty than as a human rights 
principle that protects individual defendants.  Bill Schabas has 
argued that “[t]he drafters at Rome will justify the provision by 
invoking the nullum crimen rule and human rights norms, but 
the underlying reason may be far less noble, a technique to 
stymie dynamism in the future Court.”158  The Rome Statute’s 
crime definitions demarcate where states were willing to give up 
sovereignty, at least if they fail to investigate and prosecute 
offenses, and where they were not.159 
Although less noble than justifying strict construction based 
on human rights principles, the sovereignty justification for strict 
construction warrants attention for instrumental reasons.  The 
ICC may gain legitimacy in the eyes of states by respecting the 
bounds of state consent.160  This restraint may encourage 
participation of states, like the United States, concerned about 
their citizens appearing before the court for ever more broadly-
defined crimes.161  It also may keep the court from losing the 
support or even membership of countries that signed on initially, 
158 Schabas, supra note 10, at 886–87 (“Indeed, we may well ask if the elaborate 
subject-matter jurisdiction provisions in the Rome Statute, not to mention that 
obsessive exercise in legal positivism known as the Elements of Crimes, as well as 
the entrenchment of the ‘strict construction’ principle in article 22(1) [sic], were 
reactions to the innovations of Judge Cassese and his colleagues in the 
interpretation of the ad hoc Tribunals Statutes.”). 
159 SADAT, supra note 36, at 182 (noting that in negotiations of the Rome 
Statute, the specter of cases against states’ own government officials loomed large, 
so states had an incentive to define crimes clearly so that states could understand 
the extent of the court’s jurisdiction); see also Broomhall, supra note 83, at 951; 
Schabas, supra note 10, at 886. 
160 Wessel, supra note 59, at 401. 
161 Ambiguity is one of the reasons the United States opposes the court. Id. at 
400 (citing President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signature of the 
International Criminal Court Treaty (Dec. 31, 2000), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pk 
g/WCPD-2001-01-08/pdf/WCPD-2001-01-08-Pg4.pdf) (noting that “U.S. civilian and 
military negotiators helped to ensure greater precision in the definitions of crimes”); 
see also Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 189, n.378 (noting that the vagueness of 
definitions one of U.S.’s chief concerns in not signing the Rome Statute). 
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but disagree with expansive interpretations of crimes.  As Wessel 
has noted of international courts generally, there is a “strategic 
interplay created by the tension between the legitimacy 
international courts gain from deferring to state consent and the 
‘normative bias favoring international completeness, 
predictability, coherence, and dynamism.’ ”162 
Even where states may not have intended to give up 
sovereignty, ICL is premised on the notion that some crimes are 
grave enough to warrant bending traditional notions of 
sovereignty.163  Even though the ICC’s jurisdiction is not based on 
universal jurisdiction, unless the case comes to the court through 
a Security Counsel referral, it still exclusively, or almost 
exclusively,164 adjudicates universal jurisdiction crimes.  Thus, 
too high a prioritization of sovereignty may be misplaced. 
3. Bolstering the Gravity Requirement
Arguably, lenity and strict construction can be justified as
supporting the ICC’s gravity requirement.  As a matter of 
prosecutorial discretion and jurisdiction, the Rome Statute 
requires that the crimes before the court be of sufficient 
gravity.165  Many crimes also contain independent gravity 
requirements.166  For example, the war crimes provision 
encompasses only “grave” breaches of the Geneva Conventions or 
other “serious violations of the laws [of war.]”167 
162 Wessel, supra note 59, at 382 (quoting Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial 
Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 
AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 258 (2004)). 
163 The topic of sovereignty and international law is the subject of a great deal of 
international law and international relations scholarship. This Article does not 
attempt to canvass this vast literature, but merely seeks to flag the relationship 
between concerns about sovereignty and strict construction. 
164 Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are typically considered 
universal jurisdiction crimes. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
§ 404 (1987); see also Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of
Aggression, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 381, 389 (2012) (evaluating whether aggression
is also a crime of universal jurisdiction and concluding that it arguably is, though
domestic prosecutions for aggression may be problematic).
165 See deGuzman, supra note 103, at 1405 (“[T]he concept of gravity provides a 
legal and normative basis for the Court's jurisdiction as well as the exercise of that 
jurisdiction; and second, consideration of relative gravity is an important factor in 
the Prosecutor's discretionary selection of situations and cases to pursue”). 
166 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 6–8. 
167 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 8(2)(a), 8(2)(c), 8(2)(e). 
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Strict construction may support the gravity requirement by 
way of statutory interpretation.  In many instances, the broad 
interpretation of a provision is also the extension of a crime 
definition to a slightly less grave context.  For example, in 
Lubanga the parties fought over whether the crime of “using” 
children “to participate actively in  hostilities” included children 
in support roles, such as porters and lookouts.  Using children in 
support roles, though harmful and reprehensible, arguably is not 
as bad as using them directly as fighters.168  To the extent that it 
is equally bad, due to rampant sexual abuse of the children, for 
example, it arguably constitutes any number of other 
international crimes.169  Strict construction would encourage the 
prosecution to select the more appropriate and, arguably, graver 
charges up front.  Charging the defendant with the optimal 
charge may not always be easy given the difficulties prosecutors 
face collecting evidence in hostile areas and even zones of 
ongoing conflict, but it should be encouraged. 
This gravity-enforcing notion of strict construction may put 
ICL on more solid footing from a philosophical perspective.  The 
graver the crimes, the more justified the encroachment on state 
sovereignty.170  The chief problem with this notion of strict 
construction as a means of bolstering the Rome Statute’s 
requirement is that it is an imperfect tool for guaranteeing 
gravity.  For one, the prosecution may avoid the command of 
construing ambiguous crime definitions in favor of the defendant 
by picking a vague one instead.  Moreover, it may not always be 
the case that the broad interpretation of a crime extends its 
reach to less grave conduct.  To use again the Lubanga “use” of 
child soldiers example, arguably, a better understanding of 
children in armed conflict leads to the conclusion that front line 
168 But see Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1229-AnxA, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Annex A: Written Submissions of the 
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and 
Armed Conflict Submitted in Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Jan. 29, 2007) (explaining that, when one better understands the realities 
on the ground, it becomes clear that using children in support roles is just as grave 
and should punished as harshly as using children as fighters). 
169 One problem in Lubanga was that the prosecutor did not charge sexual 
violence crimes in the first place. See Susanna Greijer, Thematic Prosecutions of 
Crimes Against Children, in THEMATIC PROSECUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SEX 
CRIMES 137, 151 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2012). 
170 See generally MAY, supra note 153, at 338 (arguing for “moral minimalism” 
in ICL). 
2017] ROME STATUTE STRICT CONSTRUCTION 73
and support roles are equally harmful, and liberal interpretation 
of the crime merely includes equally grave conduct within the 
reach of the criminal sanction.171  
III. TIMING IS EVERYTHING—OR IS IT?
If Article 22(2) is read in a way that reduces it to the 
guarantee that ambiguity in crime definitions be construed in 
favor of the defendant, which is the common law lenity canon, 
then timing is everything.  Does it come into play as soon as 
judges find an ambiguity in the text of the Rome Statute, or only 
after they consult other sources of law or exhaust other tools of 
interpretation before finding an ambiguity?172  As American 
scholars Price and Kahan have noted, “if lenity invariably comes 
in ‘last,’ it should essentially come in never.”173  Commentators 
have noted the same dynamic in ICL: “[a]pplying, at a prior 
stage, a teleological approach that maximizes victim protection 
means that there is never an ambiguity left for strict 
construction to resolve, because all ambiguities have already 
been resolved against the accused.”174 
171 The expert on child soldiers and ultimately the court in Lubanga emphasized 
that the use of child soldiers in support roles was as grave as their use in combat. 
See Davidson, supra note 147, at 398–00. 
172 Cf. Price, supra note 25, at 890 (“The key question in applying lenity, 
therefore, is what rank the rule holds relative to other interpretive conventions. If 
multiple interpretive resources—say, plain text and legislative history—were given 
equal rank to each other and to lenity, then the rule of lenity would have significant 
implications. In that case, if the text supported a broad view and the legislative 
history a narrower one, lenity would compel adoption of the latter. On the other 
hand, if other conventions came before lenity, they would often resolve ambiguities 
before lenity took effect.”); Kahan, supra note 25, at 384–85 (“The ‘meaning’ of a 
statute is a function not just of the signification of words to English-speaking people 
generally but of the interpretive conventions shared by members of the legal culture 
in particular. Statutory language is ‘ambiguous’ when these conventions conflict or 
point in different directions. Ambiguity is either avoided or resolved by giving 
certain of these conventions priority over others.”). 
173 Price, supra note 25, at 890 (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal 
Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 384–85). 
174 See Robinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 15, at 934; Perrin, supra note 15, at 
377 (“Due to the relative exhaustiveness of international interpretive doctrines, the 
maxim [in dubio pro reo] which is a fundamental interpretive principle in many 
national systems was essentially eviscerated, demonstrating the repercussions of 
relying on public international law interpretive canons to resolve international 
criminal law issues.”). 
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If, however, the guarantee of strict construction and the ban 
on analogy have meaning independent of lenity, timing may be 
less critical.  Even where lenity is effectively read out of the 
statute through interpretive techniques, the guarantee of strict 
construction and the ban on analogy may help to cabin judicial 
overreaching. 
Commentators on strict construction in ICL have largely 
fallen into one of two camps.  One camp puts lenity last and 
endorses the framework set out by the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR”).  This ECtHR framework views strict 
construction as a rather flexible notion that boils down to 
whether the broad interpretation or judicial “adaptation” of a 
crime was foreseeable and consistent with the essence of the 
offense.175  The other camp embraces a positive law approach to 
ICL interpretation and advocates a more robust version of strict 
construction wherein ambiguity is recognized sooner, without 
resort to nebulous principles of international and domestic 
criminal law or the tools of interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention, and is resolved in favor of the accused.176  This Part 
critiques the arguments of both camps and offers a more nuanced 
look at the potential ordering and meanings of lenity. 
This Part concludes that a natural and logical reading of 
Article 21 indeed puts the Article 22(2) guarantee of lenity last, 
which means that it is unlikely to play much of a role in 
interpreting the Rome Statute.  Part IV explains why putting 
175 Shahabuddeen, supra note 10; CASSESE, supra note 7; Sadat,  supra note 14, 
at 763; Van Schaack, supra note 2. Although Leena Grover also set out this 
argument in her article on interpreting the Rome Statute, it was unclear whether 
she endorsed it. Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 554. Her book on the Rome 
Statute makes clear that she believes the ECtHR formula’s notion that “the ‘essence’ 
of the offence . . . is perhaps too malleable for criminal law and therefore at risk of 
being abused,” and potentially conflicts with the ban on extending crimes by 
analogy. GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES, supra note 14, at 173–74. 
176 See Jacobs, supra note 18, at 23. Jacobs argues for the most rigorous positive 
law regime, but others are sympathetic to the problem of broad construction of ICL 
in the name of the object and purpose of fighting impunity; see also Sluiter, supra 
note 15, at 257 (decrying tribunal’s tendency to invoke “fighting impunity” as 
something like a canon of statutory construction to the detriment of the rule of 
lenity). Robinson started the conversation by noting the illiberal tendencies of ICL to 
construe crimes expansively, at the expense of the legality principle, in order to fight 
impunity, but in more recent scholarship seems not to embrace a strict version of 
lenity. Compare Robinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 15, with Robinson, ICL as 
Justice, supra note 107, at 700–01 (arguing that the most lenient interpretation of 
the law is not necessarily the best and noting the concern that the ICC become an 
“expensive acquittal machine”). 
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lenity last does not render Article 22(2) meaningless.  Giving 
independent meaning to strict construction and the bar on 
analogy may help to curtail overly aggressive judicial extensions 
of the law not only where the law is ambiguous, as in, having 
more than one meaning but also, importantly, where it is vague, 
as in, leaving one to guess at its meaning.177 
A. Lenity First: Textual Ambiguity in Rome Statute—or Rome
Documents—Alone then Lenity?
If legality were prioritized above all else, Article 22(2)
arguably would demand that any ambiguity on the face of the 
Rome Statute, or less restrictively, on the face of the Rome 
Statute and other ICC documents, such as the Elements of 
Crimes, should be resolved in favor of the defendant.178  This 
approach seems to ensure strict fidelity to the legality principle, 
since it excludes judicial recourse to uncodified principles of 
international law and general principles of domestic law to 
eliminate ambiguities.  Reliance on these sources, which are at 
best not codified by the ICC, and at worst not codified anywhere, 
seems to be the most problematic aspect of Article 21 from a 
legality perspective.  However, these legality gains come at too 
high a cost. 
Professor Dov Jacobs supports a positivist conception of ICL 
and a stricter adherence to the legality principle in interpreting 
the crimes of the Rome Statute that would support this ordering 
of lenity—or perhaps the next one, which also permits 
consultation of the Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence (“RPE”).179  Using what he calls a “functional 
approach”—under the “quantum theory of positivism”—to 
interpret the Rome Statute, he advocates interpreting the Rome 
Statute differently depending on the institutional context in 
which a provision is used180: 
177 See supra note 20. 
178 Grover likewise seems to suggest that if the court adheres strictly to the 
principle of legality, this is what strict construction means. Grover, A Call to Arms, 
supra note 14, at 557 (“If legality is recognized as the guiding principle for 
interpreting crimes in the Court’s jurisdiction, it would require the textual approach 
to prevail over competing intent as well as object and purpose based approaches to 
applying Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.”). 
179 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 2. 
180 Id. at 3–4. Professor Sadat appears to agree with reading the Rome Statute 
differently depending on the subject matter of the particular provision. Leila Nadya 
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[W]hen a Judge applies the ICC Statute in criminal
proceedings, for example, he is applying it qua treaty, but
applying it as the internal instrument for the functioning of the
Court, which therefore does not automatically warrant, as
usually claimed, the reference to the Vienna Convention as
providing the rules of interpretation.181
In sum, this means keeping Vienna out of Rome, at least when 
interpreting the ICC’s provisions dealing with crimes, and giving 
strict construction some teeth.182 
Given that the Rome Statute includes significant detail on 
many crimes and a section on general principles and defenses, 
this approach is more possible at the ICC than it would have 
been at previous international tribunals.183  It also squares with 
the plain text of Article 22(2), as well as the states parties’ 
apparent desire to avoid the freewheeling judicial lawmaking of 
the ad hoc tribunals and the Rome Statute’s purported 
commitment to making the ICC a model human rights 
institution. 
However, this approach to reading the Rome Statute is hard 
to reconcile with textualism, which, after all, looks at the text of 
a statute in the context of other provisions of the statute, since it 
would make other provisions of the Rome Statute nonsensical. 
Why enumerate sources of law in Article 21 if judges are only 
permitted to base their interpretation of the statute on the 
statute itself?  It likewise appears to contravene Article 9, which 
provides that the “[e]lements of Crimes shall assist the Court in 
the interpretation and application of articles 6 [genocide], 7 
[crimes against humanity] and 8 [war crimes].”184  Finally, some 
of the crime definitions in fact incorporate by reference other 
Sadat, Legacy of the ICTY: The International Criminal Court, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
1073, 1078 (2003) (“[T]eleological methods should be applied to constitutive aspects 
and provisions representing foundational principles of the Rome Statute, while 
canons of strict construction are the appropriate guide to interpreting the ‘legislation 
within the Statute,’—that is, the definitions of crimes, which should be narrowly 
interpreted in accordance with the legality principle and article 22(2)’s command 
that definitions of crimes shall be strictly construed and not extended by analogy.”). 
181 Jacobs, supra note 18, at 38 (arguing that the institutional context in which 
the document will be applied is more important than the manner in which it was 
created). 
182 Like Judge Van den Wyngaert, he appears to believe that strict construction 
applies not only to the articles defining the substantive crimes, but also to the 
provisions dealing with forms of liability. Jacobs, supra note 18, at 15–16. 
183 See discussion infra note 43. 
184 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 9. 
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fields of international law, so, at least for those provisions, a 
strict “Rome Statute only” approach to lenity contravenes the 
intent of states parties.185 
Further, the costs of this strict version of strict construction 
may simply be too high in relation to the relatively modest 
benefits.  Although the ICC should be a model human rights-
respecting criminal institution, it is not clear that it needs to be 
the world’s leader on lenity, which, after all, appears not to rise 
to the level of a human right recognized by customary 
international law.186  Where lenity exists chiefly to protect state 
sovereignty, not defendants’ rights, we may not wish to prioritize 
it so starkly over other legitimate goals, including human rights 
enforcement.187 
This very strict version of lenity seems a prime example of 
the “danger [of courts] over-correct[ing]” in response to the liberal 
critique of ICL.188  As Professor Darryl Robinson has noted,  
whereas the ad hoc tribunals were accused of being “conviction 
machines,” the ICC “is much more likely to be accused of being a 
very expensive ‘acquittal machine.’ ”189 
This lenity-first approach also may prove unworkable despite 
the relatively detailed definitions set out in the Rome Statute. 
As Jolly and Sadat have noted, strict textualism is harder in ICL 
than in domestic jurisdictions.  The textualist penchant for 
pulling out the dictionary gets rather difficult with a treaty with 
official translations in six different languages.190  A resort to 
plain language is likely to lead to a great deal of ambiguity, and a  
185 See, e.g., id. at art. 8(2) (“For the purpose of this Statute, war crimes means: 
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Convention: . . . (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of
international law . . . .”) (emphasis added).
186 Id. at art. 8(2)(a). 
187 GALLANT, supra note 4, at 359. 
188 See Robinson, ICL as Justice, supra note 107, at 700. 
189 See id. 
190 Sadat, supra note 14, at 765 (“While resort to the dictionary is sometimes 
useful, and was a technique employed by the judges in Lubanga regarding the 
meaning of ‘enlistment’ and ‘conscription’, this is a methodology to be sparingly 
employed given that a text like the Rome Statute is ‘authentic’ or official in six 
languages and is a highly complex instrument with ancillary texts like the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes that complete its meaning.”). 
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bloated role for the lenity canon, particularly when compared to 
domestic jurisdictions, which, if they recognize it at all, invoke it 
inconsistently.191 
Importantly, this lenity-first approach to Article 22(2) may 
make for unnecessary divergences between ICL and IHL, and to 
the detriment of both bodies of law.  The Rome Statute would be 
interpreted in a vacuum with no regard to IHL, international law 
generally, or general principles of criminal law other than those 
explicitly provided for in the statute.  This may make for a rather 
ill-informed ICL, which is unfair to defendants, particularly 
military commanders who are likely to rely on military training 
in IHL. 
Putting lenity first also may undermine enforcement of 
IHL.192  The outcry over the ICTY trial chamber’s decision on 
targeting in the Gotovina decision seems to be an apt example of 
problematic ICL interpretation with insufficient regard to 
established principles of IHL.193  In Gotovina, “the Trial Chamber 
found that all impact sites located more than 200 metres from a 
target it deemed legitimate served as evidence of an unlawful 
artillery attack.”194  Commentators complained that the trial 
chamber’s overly strict test had no basis in IHL and would lead  
191 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
192 The International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, has supported 
criminal sanctions for violations of IHL in order to increase deterrence. It believes 
that, due to the criminalization of IHL norms, “states will make a greater effort to 
teach and integrate the law effectively within state institutions and civil society, and 
will prosecute and punish the perpetrators of any IHL violations.” Patrick Zahnd, 
How the International Criminal Court Should Help Implement International 
Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 
ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 43 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (noting 
that the threat of the ICC stepping in if a state fails to investigate or punish is 
additional motivation). 
193 See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, Operational Law Experts Roundtable on the 
Gotovina Judgment: Military Operations, Battlefield Reality and the Judgment’s 
Impact on Effective Implementation and Enforcement of International Humanitarian 
Law, in EMORY PUB. L. & LEG. THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES, No. 12-186, 2 (Jan. 28, 
2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1994414; see also Gary Solis, The Gotovina 
Acquittal: A Sound Appellate Course Correction, 215 MIL. L. REV. 78, 82 (2013) (“The 
Gotovina-Markac trial judgment rested heavily on a flawed standard of artillery 
accuracy, which the AC [Appeals Chamber] unanimously found to have no support 
in either the record of trial or the real world of armed conflict.”). 
194  Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgement, 25–67 (Nov. 16, 
2012) (discussing and rejecting the Trial Chamber’s 200 meter standard). 
2017] ROME STATUTE STRICT CONSTRUCTION 79
military commanders to disregard the teachings of ICL or find 
ways around the test that would wind up incurring more civilian 
casualties.195 
Interpreted in the strictest, Rome Statute only sense, the 
lenity-first version of Article 22(2) likewise upends a great deal of 
work, including in the elaboration of the Elements of Crimes.  As 
Leena Grover has noted, the Elements of Crimes document is a 
helpful interpretive tool that serves as a  “ ‘decoder’ of archaic 
language in the Rome Statute,” and also fills in details where the 
provisions of the Rome Statute are vague or ambiguous.196  The 
legality gain of permitting judges to analyze the text of only the 
Rome Statute, rather than the Rome Statute and the Elements of 
Crimes, before turning to lenity, seems minimal.  Although the 
Elements of Crimes was negotiated after the Rome Statute, the 
states parties agreed to its creation in the Rome Statute, it was 
the product of negotiations among states parties, and it too only 
applies to defendants prosecuted after its creation.197 
B. Ambiguity After All of Article 21 Sources then Lenity?
An alternative Article 21 focused ordering would permit
judges to interpret the Rome Statute using all of the sources set 
out in Article 21 to guide them before turning to the lenity canon. 
Judges therefore could draw on the Elements of Crimes and, if 
relevant, RPE, as well as general principles of international law 
or those derived from national systems, to help them resolve 
ambiguities in ICC law.  This version of lenity represents a less 
rigorous legality regime.  It deemphasizes the lenity canon 
because judges have more tools of interpretation at their disposal 
before finding an ambiguity.  However, this ordering is a more 
sensible reading of Article 22 in light of Article 21 than the 
others above.  Why permit the judges to consult those other 
sources of law, if not to help them to interpret and produce more 
refined definitions of the crimes? 
One difficulty with this approach is identifying just what 
strict construction, analogizing, or ambiguity means in a world of 
many possibly contradictory and unwritten sources of law. 
195 Blank, supra note 193, at 3–7. 
196 Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 576. 
197 The Elements of Crimes was completed on June 30, 2000. See Philippe 
Kirsch & Valerie Oosterveld, The Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 563, 564 (2001). 
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Judges have shown themselves to be rather keen to declare that 
customary international law has an answer to questions based on 
dubious evidence to avoid a finding of an ambiguity.198  The same 
difficulty presents itself with putting lenity “dead last.”199 
C. Dead Last—All of Article 21 Plus Canons of Construction,
Including the Vienna Convention then Lenity?
The approach described above gives a greater role to lenity
than the dead last approach, which puts the lenity canon after all 
of the Article 21 sources and cannons of interpretation, including 
the tools of the Vienna Convention.  This dead last approach 
prevailed at the ICTY200 and appears to be the dominant 
approach at the ICC.201 
198 See generally Joseph Powderly, Distinguishing Creativity from Activism: 
International Criminal Law and the ‘Legitimacy’ of Judicial Development of the Law, 
in ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2013). 
199 Cf. Price, supra note 25, at 891 (2004) (using the term “dead last” to describe 
invocation of the lenity canon only after exhausting all other tools of statutory 
interpretation). 
200 This dead last vision of strict construction was the prevailing one at the 
ICTY. See Prosecutor v. Hadz ̆ihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Separate and 
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hunt: Command Responsibility Appeal, (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003); see also Prosecutor v. Delalic, 
Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶ 413 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Nov. 16, 1998) (stating that “[t]he effect of strict construction of the provisions of a 
criminal statute is that where an equivocal word or ambiguous sentence leaves a 
reasonable doubt of its meaning which the canons of construction fail to solve, the 
benefit of the doubt should be given to the subject and against the legislature which 
has failed to explain itself” but nevertheless choosing the broad construction) 
(emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on 
Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction—Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
¶ 27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003) (noting the 
defendant’s argument that “in case of doubt as to the content or meaning of a rule, 
the interpretation most favourable to the accused should be adopted” but finding no 
ambiguity in the statute after consulting the language of the ICTY Statute, 
Nuremberg and ICTY caselaw, the objects and purposes of the statute, and 
legislative history); Prosecutor v. Hadz̆ihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision 
on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command 
Responsibility, ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003) (July 
16, 2003) (stating, in response to the defendant’s argument that “[u]ncertainty in the 
law must be interpreted in favour of the accused,” that, “As I understand the 
injunctions of the maxim in dubio pro reo and of the associated principle of strict 
construction in criminal proceedings, those injunctions operate on the result 
produced by a particular method of interpretation but do not necessarily control the 
selection of the method”). 
201 See discussion infra note 205. Some commentators take it as a given that 
strict construction comes last. See, e.g., Broomhall, supra note 83, at 961 (“[L]ike the 
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In Katanga, the court made it clear that, in its view, strict 
construction was the absolute last resort.202  It acknowledged that 
under Article 22, the court may not define new crimes by analogy 
or extend the crimes to situations the drafters of the Rome 
Statute did not intend.203  Espousing a positivist, jura novit curia-
style vision of the law, it noted:  “The primary task of the bench 
in criminal cases is the application and interpretation of the law 
but, under no circumstances, creation of the law, since the sole 
purpose of the bench’s interpretative activity is to impart 
meaning to existing law.”204  This seems like a reasonably strict 
version of strict construction.  However, the court immediately 
cabined this language, stating that Article 22(2)’s guarantee of 
strict construction, or as it called it: 
in dubio pro reo . . . is applicable only ‘in case of ambiguity’ and 
clearly should be relied on only after an unsuccessful attempt at 
interpretation effected in good faith and in accordance with the 
General Rule of the Vienna Convention or in accordance with 
article 32 of the Convention.205 
The most problematic aspect of relying on the Vienna 
Convention is its acceptance of teleological interpretation, or at 
least the version of it many judges have deployed to justify 
expansive readings of crimes.  As noted above, international 
judges’ reliance on the object and purpose analysis to justify 
expansive interpretation is controversial.  Part IV.A.2 proposes a 
way to cabin the dangers of teleological interpretation. 
D. Backstop Rule of Foreseeability and Consistency with the
“Essence” of the Offense
Many ICL commentators argue that strict legality is neither
feasible nor desirable for ICL, which in turn permits a less strict 
notion of strict construction.206  According to this view, what is 
rule of strict construction, analogy is an interpretative technique used as the last in 
a series of steps.”). 
202 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 50–57 (Mar. 7, 2014). 
203 Id. ¶ 52. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. ¶ 53. 
206 Sadat, supra note 14, at 763 (“[I]t is not possible (or appropriate) to ‘elevate 
strict construction over every other goal of the ICC Statute, including substantive 
justice’ ”); see also Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 178–80; Luban, supra note 101, at 
581.
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required by the principle of legality is that a judicial 
interpretation is “reasonably foreseeable” and consistent with the 
“essence” of an offence.207  This formulation seems to depend less 
on the ordering of the lenity canon for its weakness, since it 
appears to presume that lenity—construing ambiguities in favor 
of defendants—rarely comes into play due to the many 
interpretive techniques at a judge’s disposal.  This Part assesses 
this formula and concludes that, though it is commendable for 
trying to strike a balance between reality and theory, it 
ultimately requires refinement. 
Two particular cases in which the European Court of Human 
Rights heard claims relating to the United Kingdom’s 
elimination of its marital defense to rape figure prominently in 
this notion of strict construction.208  In these cases, the ECtHR 
held that the UK’s judicial elimination of the marriage defense to 
rape did not violate nullum crimen sine lege.209  The court 
explained that nullum crimen sine lege “cannot be read as 
outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal 
liability through judicial interpretation from case to case, 
provided that the resultant development is consistent with the 
essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.”210  So, the 
207 Sadat, supra note 14, at 763 (quoting SW v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) 363, ¶ 36, 49 (1995)); see also Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Policy-Oriented 
Law in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in MAN’S 
INHUMANITY TO MAN: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF ANTONIO 
CASSESE 889 (2003) (defending a policy-oriented approach and advocating the same 
formula). 
208 SW v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 363, (ser. A) ¶ 36, 49 (1995); C.R. v. 
the United Kingdom, 1995 Eur. Ct. H.R. 51, ¶ 42 (1995). 
209 Van Schaack also embraces the ECtHR foreseeability formula in her 
discussion of the broader concept of nullum crimen sine lege. She explains that 
although international courts from Nuremberg to The Hague have engaged in 
common law-style law making, they nevertheless adhered to the crux of the legality 
principle—foreseeability. Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 178–180. Still, she contends 
ICL has reached a more mature stage and thus should begin to respect a more 
robust conception of legality. Id. at 192. Gallant also endorses this foreseeability 
test. He states, of the ICC, “[p]roblems of legality in crime definition should arise 
only if crimes are not sufficiently clearly defined (do not meet lex certa) or if the 
court interprets them in a broad and unforeseeable manner, in violation of its 
statute.” See GALLANT, supra note 4, at 336, 362–66. 
210 C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335-C Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 34 (1995); see also 
Shahabuddeen, supra note 10, at 1012, 1017 (emphasis added) (“ ‘[A]s was indicated 
by the European Court of Human Rights in C.R. v the United Kingdom, the principle 
of nullum crimen sine lege does not bar development of the law through clarification 
or interpretation 'provided that the resultant development is consistent with the 
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argument goes, ambiguities in the law can be resolved through 
interpretation, rather than automatically choosing the 
interpretation that favors the accused. 
Although “[t]he Rome Statute does not expressly admit the 
qualification of foreseeability,”211 it is possible that the court will 
read strict construction this way.  Judges of the ICTY and the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) embraced a similar 
foreseeability formula for nullum crimen sine lege and strict 
construction.212 
This foreseeability and consistency rule has its allure.  For 
one, it has the imprimatur of the ECtHR, which would allow the 
ICC to claim adherence to international human rights principles 
in construing the reach of Article 22(2).  Second, it seems to 
recognize that there is something to strict construction beyond 
lenity, such that even if the ICC used the sources of law and  
techniques of interpretation that its statute and this Article 
suggest it ought to, there would remain some constraint on 
judicial overreaching. 
It bears noting though that the ECtHR formula derives from 
a very different institutional context.  The ECtHR hears claims 
from individuals who argue that a state has violated their rights 
under the European Convention of Human Rights (“European 
Convention”).  Much like a U.S. federal court examining a state 
court’s interpretation of state law, the ECtHR is very deferential 
to national courts’ interpretations of their own laws.213 
essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.’ So, it is the essence of the 
offence—or its ‘very essence’—that governs.”); CASSESE, supra note 7, at 150. 
211 Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 555. 
212 See supra notes 10 and 11 (discussing ICTY judges’ embracing of this 
foreseeability formula); Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), 
Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 
¶ 25 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004) (“ ‘In interpreting the principle 
nullum crimen sine lege, it is critical to determine whether the underlying conduct at 
the time of its commission was punishable. The emphasis on conduct, rather than on 
the specific description of the offence in substantive criminal law, is of primary 
relevance.’ In other words it must be ‘foreseeable and accessible to a possible 
perpetrator that his concrete conduct was punishable.’ ”) (citing Prosecutor v. 
Hadz̆ihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 
¶ 62 (Nov. 12, 2002)). 
213  C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335-C Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 34 (1995). See also Theodor 
Meron, Editorial Comment, Revival of Customary International Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 817, 826 (2005).
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The European Convention, which the ECtHR is charged with 
interpreting, and the Rome Statute articulate radically different 
positions on the role of legality in the context of grave 
international crimes.  The European Convention has an explicit 
carve-out for crimes based on the general principles of civilized 
nations that was designed to dispense with nullum crimen sine 
lege arguments in the context of serious international crimes.214   
The Rome Statute, which deals only with serious international 
crimes,215 has departed from this compromised view of legality in 
the context of international crimes through Article 22’s 
guarantee of nullum crimen sine lege and strict construction.216 
Reflecting this institutional context, the ECtHR’s test is 
insufficiently rigorous.  At first blush, foreseeability seems 
reasonably clear:  Was it foreseeable that the court read the 
Rome Statute so as to include the defendant’s conduct?  However, 
it raises the question, foreseeable to whom?  To the defendant? 
To a defendant with a good international criminal defense lawyer 
on retainer?  To states?  Moreover, commentators have 
questioned, particularly in light of international judges’ track 
record of expansive interpretation, whether the foreseeability 
test really “exclude[s] anything.”217 
The second part of the test, which asks whether the 
interpretation is consistent with the “essence of the offense,”218 is 
even more problematic.  International crimes are hard to reduce 
to their essence, at least without reducing them all to the same 
crime—as crimes that offend all humanity or crimes that offend 
the international community.  If one tries to distill each of the 
214 See GALLANT, supra note 4, at 203. FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 164. Article 
7 of the European Convention provides: “No punishment without law 1. No one shall 
be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it 
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2. This Article shall not 
prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at 
the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of 
law recognised by civilised nations.” European Convention on Human Rights, art. 7 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (emphasis added). 
215 But see deGuzman, supra note 103, at 1408 (questioning whether all 
international crimes are grave). 
216 See supra Part I.A. 
217 Darryl Robinson, Legality and Our Contradictory Commitments: Some 
Thoughts About How We Think, 103 AM. SOC. INT’L L. 104, 104 (2009) (quoted in 
GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES, supra note 14, at 171). 
218 See discussion supra note 210. 
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categories of crimes to its essence, problems persist.  For 
example, scholars and courts have thus far been unable to come 
up with a satisfying core conception or unifying theory of crimes 
against humanity.219  Perhaps genocide is some serious, harmful 
act done with the intent to destroy in whole or in part an 
enumerated group, but this “essence” leaves open critical 
questions about the boundaries of the harmful acts, and mens rea 
requirements across groups of perpetrators who play varying 
roles.  Perhaps war crimes could be reduced to serious violations 
of the laws of war?  Again, this approach seems to eviscerate the 
advancements in ICL of the last twenty-five years.  If this 
reductive, essentialist approach is all that strict construction 
demands, it seems a significant step backwards in the 
development of ICL.  Like foreseeability, the “essence” test seems 
to permit just about anything. 
For these reasons, this Article proposes another formula for 
strict construction or, viewed differently, an alternative to strict 
construction when the lenity canon is inevitably read out of the 
statute through interpretation. 
IV. A BETTER CONSTRUCTION OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION
This Part offers a reading of Article 22(2) that is both
meaningful and realistic in the context of ICL.  In broad terms, it 
agrees with other commentators that Article 22(2) is an 
admonition to judges to exercise restraint in interpreting crimes 
and making law220 which, like it or not, they will inevitably do. 
219 See Margaret M. deGuzman, The Elusive Essence of Crimes Against 
Humanity, in FOR THE SAKE OF PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS: ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN HONOUR OF ROGER S. CLARK 1, 12 
(Suzannah Linton et al. eds., Brill/Nijhoff, 2015) (noting a tension in any attempt to 
define crimes against humanity between the goal of distinguishing crimes against 
humanity from domestic crimes and the goal of capturing all conduct “shock[ing] to 
humanity’s conscience”). See also Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in 
the Modern Age, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 334 (2013) (noting the “absence of a 
consistent definition and uniform interpretation of crimes against humanity has 
made it difficult to establish the theory underlying such crimes and to prosecute 
them in particular cases,” and noting that Pretrial Chambers of the ICC have 
reached varying conclusions on the state or organizational policy requirement). 
220 See GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES, supra note 14, at 202 (arguing that “the 
rule of strict construction should require judges of the Court to ‘interpret crimes in 
the Statute in a moderate manner’, meaning that they are interpreting and applying 
existing definitions of crimes rather than crafting new ones and favouring the 
suspect or accused when the intent of the provision as it relates to the interpretive 
issue before the Court is ‘left in doubt’ ”); Shahabuddeen, supra note 10, at 1017 
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This Article refines this prescription to tailor it to the legitimate 
aims of strict construction.  Borrowing from Professor John 
Jeffries’s work on lenity and vagueness in statutory construction, 
it argues that judges must: avoid unfair surprise to defendants; 
avoid extending crimes to conduct that states parties anticipated 
and intended not to cover; make—or interpret—law in a way that 
leads to greater clarity in the law; and, finally, avoid case-specific 
lawmaking.221 
This Part then examines the application of these guidelines 
in the context of the Rome Statute’s idiosyncratic blend of 
statutory text that is sometimes specific and sometimes vague 
and contains references to loose sources of law such as 
international law and general principles derived from national 
systems.  It also addresses statutory interpretation in the face of 
“constructive ambiguity,” language that was left ambiguous by 
design due to an inability of drafters to reach an agreement on 
any one meaning.222 
In Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal 
Statutes, Professor John Jeffries rejects lenity and strict 
construction because he finds the underlying justification of 
notice and separation of powers unconvincing in the domestic 
context.  He argues that when judges face ambiguity, rather than 
picking the most lenient interpretation, for which he sees no 
justification in domestic criminal law, judges should pick the best 
interpretation.223  This Article does not go so far as to reject 
(“Licence is not appropriate; a useful brake is supplied by the important principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege and associated doctrines. It is difficult to exaggerate the 
importance of that principle. But perhaps it should not be exaggerated.”); Joseph 
Powderly, The Rome Statute and the Attempted Corseting of the Interpretive Judicial 
Function: Reflections on Sources of Law and Interpretive Techniques, in THE LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 444, 498 (2015) (arguing 
that the drafters of the Rome Statute intended Article 22 to constrain judges, but 
that it should not preclude reasonable interpretation and development of the law). 
221 Jeffries’s recommendations are offered as constraints on judges that remain 
even without lenity. Jeffries, supra note 22, at 195. 
222 See discussion supra notes 52, 130. 
223 Jeffries, supra note 22, at 221 (“Sometimes statutory ambiguity presents an 
essentially binary choice. The law is either A or B; whichever is chosen, future 
coverage is fairly clear. In such a case, strict construction would dictate exculpation, 
and this would be true even though the actor’s conduct was both dangerous and 
reprehensible, even though there was no prospect of unfair surprise, and even 
though the result left an irrational gap in the law. In my view, this approach does 
not make sense. Faced with this kind of binary choice—where neither outcome is 
precluded by express or implied legislative decision, where there is no threat of 
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lenity.  It merely acknowledges, as did Judge Shahabuddeen, 
that few ambiguities are likely to remain after judges employ the 
various interpretive devices at their disposal.  ICC judges are 
unlikely to be faced with a clear “binary choice” between two 
interpretations of a crime standing in equipoise224 or, perhaps, 
judges will seldom recognize equipoise.  Given this reality, these 
interpretive guidelines may offer a better way of reading strict 
construction than the reductionist ECtHR formula discussed 
above. 
In lieu of picking the most lenient interpretation of a statute, 
Jeffries advocates interpreting criminal statutes by considering 
the merits of the particular issue, not the particular case, at 
hand,225 subject to “three generalized constraints”: courts “should 
avoid usurpation of legislative authority,” courts “should avoid 
interpretations that threaten unfair surprise,” and, finally, 
judges “confronting ambiguity in a penal statute might usefully 
ask whether a proposed resolution makes the law more or less 
certain.”226 
This Part advocates a variation of this interpretive mandate 
tailored to the justifications for strict construction at the ICC. 
Judges should choose the best interpretation of the statute in 
light of the issue at hand, subject to the certain constraints 
designed to address the valid objectives of strict construction in 
the ICC context.  First, judges should avoid usurpations of state 
authority.  This inquiry looks to whether states have delegated 
lawmaking authority and reconceives the objects and purposes 
inquiry.  Second, judges should avoid unfair surprise to 
defendants.  This constraint looks at the strength of the support 
for a particular interpretation.  Where the statute is ambiguous 
or vague, the absence of a preexisting international norm 
criminalizing the conduct creates a rebuttable presumption of 
unfair surprise.  Finally, judges should attempt to clarify ICL 
and international law generally.  In most instances, this will 
[unfair] surprise, and where neither construction embraces an open-ended 
commitment to ad hoc criminalization—a judge should do whatever seems right.”). 
224 Id. 
225 Id. (“[I]n the criminal law, this urge toward particularity should be avoided. 
In this context, judicial lawmaking is best where it is not fact-specific. The trouble 
with fact-specific innovation is that it invites further innovation on other facts; it 
implies an open-ended, flexible, progressive character inimical to the appropriate 
rule-of-law constraints on the use of penal sanctions.”). 
226 Id. at 220–21. 
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mean reading ICL consistently with IHL and international 
human rights.  However, there will be instances where a 
narrower reading of ICL is warranted, such as where states 
intended to exclude the conduct from the crime or where there is 
a risk of unfair surprise.  In these instances, ICC judges may 
clarify the law through transparent reasoning on how they 
reached a particular definition of the crime and why it diverged 
from IHL or human rights norms.  These guidelines better 
address the concerns that undergird Article 22’s guarantee of 
strict construction than any of the orderings or approaches 
described in Part III above. 
A. Avoiding Usurpations of State Authority
Avoiding usurpation of legislative authority can be
translated in the ICC context to a command to interpret the 
Rome Statute consistently with state intent, where it is possible 
to ascertain, and to avoid including within a crime definition 
something that states parties clearly meant to exclude.  To 
borrow the words of an ICTY trial chamber, to respect the intent 
of the legislature means simply “not to fill omissions in 
legislation when this can be said to have been deliberate.”227  
Thus, some gap filling and interpreting is permitted: “[if] the 
omission was accidental, it is usual to supply the missing words 
to give the legislation the meaning intended.”228  This prohibition 
on filling intentional blanks in statutory coverage is in essence 
the French notion of strict construction.229 
This prescription addresses concerns about respecting state 
intent and encouraging state participation in the Rome regime. 
It also adequately addresses any concerns about separation of 
powers, which, as discussed above, at any rate are weak at the 
227 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶ 412 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998). Schabas, supra note 10, at 854. 
Jeffries contends that separation of powers does not explain much, but in the context 
of statutory interpretation it demands merely “that judicial lawmaking not be 
inconsistent with legislative choice.” Jeffries, supra note 22, at 204–5 (“This means 
chiefly that courts should not place on a statute a meaning that its text will not bear, 
or that is plainly contradicted by legislative history, or that does unnecessary 
violence to the policy expressed in some other enactment.”). 
228 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶ 412 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); Schabas, supra note 10, at 854; 
Jeffries, supra note 22, at 204–5. 
229 See discussion supra note 28. 
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ICC.  As discussed below, there is no usurpation where states 
have delegated lawmaking authority through vague language or 
constructive ambiguity.  By contrast, circular teleological 
analysis invoking the need to “end impunity” to justify crime 
expansion runs afoul of this constraint. 
1. Vagueness and Constructive Ambiguity as Delegation
It is important to be clear on what qualifies as usurpation.
Where language in the Rome Statute is specific and clear, there 
is a strong argument that states were not delegating lawmaking 
authority and, therefore, judicial lawmaking would amount to 
usurpation.  By contrast, vague provisions or provisions that 
incorporate by reference other fields of law, such as IHL, suggest 
that states were delegating lawmaking power.230  Interpretation 
and application of the law is therefore necessary and consistent 
with the intent of states parties.231  Still, judges must exercise 
care to interpret broad provisions in a way that does not offend 
the next principle of unfair surprise to defendants.232 
Constructive ambiguity, like vagueness, also constitutes a 
delegation.  Where states agreed to a compromise definition in 
the Rome Statute that was intentionally ambiguous, as in the 
case of gender,233 they were on notice that the court might land 
on an interpretation that differed from their own by consulting 
other sources of law and using standard tools of interpretation, 
230 Danner, supra note 116, at 44–49 (discussing the possibility that the Security 
Council delegated lawmaking authority to the ICTY and that the ICTY was acting 
as a faithful agent in lawmaking); Ginsburg, supra note 115, at 641–47; GROVER, 
INTERPRETING CRIMES, supra note 14, at 401 (arguing that “the strict construction 
imperative is rebutted where States choose to insert in the Rome Statute open-
textured language, thereby signalling the delegation of a greater than normal degree 
of law-making power to judges”). 
231 See discussion supra notes 112–113 (discussing separation of powers and 
delegation). 
232 International judges seem to be aware of the need for care in interpreting 
broad provisions so as not to unfairly surprise defendants. See Van Schaack, supra 
note 2, at 138–140 (discussing the ICTY’s caselaw on the legality of the crimes 
against humanity of “other inhumane acts”); see also Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case 
No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, ¶ 625 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 
17, 2005) (noting that “the principle of legality requires that a trier of fact exercise 
great caution in finding that an alleged act, not regulated elsewhere in Article 5 of 
the Statute, forms part of this crime [of “other inhumane acts”]: norms of criminal 
law must always provide individuals with sufficient notice of what is criminal 
behaviour and what is not”) (quoted in Van Schaack, supra note 2, at n.79). 
233 See discussion supra note 128–133. 
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such as those set out in the Vienna Convention.  Ascertaining the 
intentionality of the ambiguity will, of course, require recourse to 
travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute.  The task for judges is 
to determine whether the ambiguity was intentional or merely a 
drafting error.  For intentionally ambiguous provisions, like 
vague ones, judges must ascertain whether, in light of applicable 
international law and general principles derived from national 
judicial systems and relevant tools of interpretation of 
international law, extending the criminal prohibition of the Rome 
Statute to the conduct in question makes sense.234 
By contrast, where there is strong evidence that States Party 
meant for certain conduct to be excluded from the coverage of a 
crime, reading conduct into an existing crime under the Rome 
Statute would amount to a usurpation of state intent.  The Rome 
Statute’s treatment of chemical weapons arguably is an example 
of such an intentional exclusion.235  The Rome Statute’s war 
crimes provisions relating to “employing poison or poisoned 
weapons” and “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all 
analogous liquid, materials or devices” are ambiguous.236  
Plausible arguments can be made on the face of the provision 
that the language includes or excludes biological and chemical 
weapons.237  If states intended to exclude chemical weapons from 
234 See discussion supra note 128–133. 
235 See Beth Van Schaack, Chemical Weapons Use Returns to Syria, JUST 
SECURITY (Aug. 8, 2016, 11:09 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/32309/chemical-
weapons-returns-syria/ (“Coming cold to the text of the ICC Statute, one would 
assume the genus crimes of ‘employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and 
all analogous liquids, materials or devices’ would encompass the use of chemical 
(and maybe some biological) weapons. Knowing the treaty’s drafting history, 
however, reveals that a provision specifically penalizing the use of ‘chemical 
weapons’ was deliberately rejected by delegates as part of a compromise around the 
inclusion of nuclear weapons.”). 
236 See Alex Whiting, The International Criminal Court, the Islamic State, and 
Chemical Weapons, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2015, 10:36 AM), https://www.justsecu 
rity.org/27359/icc-islamic-state-chemical-weapons/. 
237 Whether or not the Rome Statute prohibits the use of chemical weapons has 
been the subject of recent academic debate relating to the use of chemical weapons 
in Syria and Iraq. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, Can the ICC Prosecute for Use of Chemical 
Weapons in Syria?, EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-icc-
prosecute-for-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria/; Kevin Jon Heller, The Rome Statute 
Does Not Criminalise Chemical and Biological Weapons, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 5, 
2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/11/05/why-the-rome-statute-does-not-criminalise-
chemical-and-biological-weapons/; Ralf Trapp, The Investigation Into the Islamic 
State and Chemical Weapons, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 27, 2015, 9:40 AM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/27116/investigation-islamic-state-chemical-weapons/. 
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the ambit of the provision, then judges should not read the crime 
into the statute on the back end.  Such a result may feel deeply 
dissatisfying in the face of horrific acts deserving of 
condemnation, but is nevertheless superior from a legality 
perspective and from the perspective of maintaining continued 
participation of states in the ICC regime. 
When ICC judges do then engage in judicial lawmaking, as 
they should with cases of constructive ambiguity, the process is 
more democratic than it may seem.  Because ascertaining 
general principles of international law and general principles 
derived from national judicial systems forces judges to look at 
international conventions and state practice, it is inherently an 
inquiry into the level of consensus on a given issue.238  Thus, in 
essence, Article 21 directs judges to ascertain whether there is a 
consensus that particular conduct falls within the ambit of a 
particular crime of the Rome Statute, not as a legislative matter, 
but through interpretation.  Since an estimation of consensus is 
part of the inquiry, judges are less likely to enact controversial 
expansions of the law.239  In essence, judges must wait for a norm 
to develop. 
This recognition of a delegation and, in turn, refusal to 
recognize a usurpation, is consistent with Article 22’s command 
that ambiguities in crime definitions be construed in favor of the 
defendant.  As explained above, the most sensible reading of the 
Rome Statute makes clear that an ambiguity, for the purposes of 
Article 22(2)’s command of lenity, is not an ambiguity on the face 
of the Rome Statute, but rather an ambiguity remaining after all 
sources of law in Article 21 and standard tools of interpretation 
are exhausted.240 
238 Cf. Jacobs, supra note 18, at 19 (noting that “when asking judges to identify 
and apply customary law, we are necessarily asking them, maybe not to act as 
legislators, but at least to think as ones. In this sense, the reference to political or 
moral considerations by judges is in fact legitimate when it comes to this source of 
law” but arguing against the ICC’s use of CIL in interpreting crimes). It bears noting 
that critics of traditional CIL have argued that it is undemocratic. ILC CIL 1, supra 
note 18, ¶ 98 n.235. 
239 Jeffries, supra note 22, at 205 (arguing that separation of powers “also 
means . . . that in confronting statutory ambiguity, courts should ordinarily avoid 
large-scale innovation. In other words, courts should avoid, where possible, 
interpretations that embrace controversial perceptions of public policy”). 
240 See supra Part III. 
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2. Object and Purpose, Defined Properly
This notion of avoiding usurpations of state authority and
respecting state intent includes a teleological inquiry into “object 
and purpose,” but it differs from the one courts and 
commentators currently employ.  The invocation of the object and 
purpose of “ending impunity” to justify a number of fairly big 
leaps has been rightly criticized.241  Under a correct view of the 
object and purpose of the Rome Statute, the best interpretation is 
not necessarily the broadest, because the object and purpose of 
the Rome Statute is not simply to “end impunity.”242  Rather, it is 
to condemn and punish people who have been found guilty of 
committing gross violations of ICL through fair trials conducted 
in accordance with international human rights and the rule of 
law. 
Certainly, the preamble of the Rome Statute announces the 
goal of “ending impunity,” but the object and purpose of the Rome 
Statute is far bigger than this rather lofty, but ultimately 
circular, aim.  In a human rights-enforcing criminal institution 
like the ICC, it seems fair to assume that the framers sought to 
end impunity for—or start punishing—people who in fact have 
committed international crimes.  One need not even assume this, 
however, since the Rome Statute itself says so.  The language on 
ending impunity is more nuanced than is typically admitted.  The 
Rome Statute affirms that: “[T]he most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured 
by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing 
international cooperation.”243  Thus, the Rome Statute announces 
the rather obvious goal of seeking to punish people who have 
committed “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
241 See supra note 15. 
242 Leena Grover has another way of cabining object and purpose analysis. She 
argues that judges, to they extent they engage in an inquiry into objects and 
purposes, “should, to the greatest extent possible, be limited to commenting about 
the mischief that the relevant criminal prohibition—as opposed to the Rome regime 
as a whole—is intended to address.” GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES, supra note 14, 
at 217. This solution is an improvement in that it ends resort to the empty “ending 
impunity” mantra of crime expansion, but it also risks expansion through a 
conflation of the object and purpose of a Rome Statute prohibition with the object 
and purpose of the underlying IHR or IHL norm. For that reason, this Article 
suggests that inquiry into the objects and purposes of the Rome Statute requires 
recognition of the ICC as a human rights-respecting criminal justice system. 
243 Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (emphasis added). 
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international community” through “effective prosecution,” not the 
goal of punishing people for all serious conduct that the court 
may later declare to be crimes. 
Other aspects of the Rome Statute lend support to ending 
the use of object and purpose analysis as a free pass to crime 
expansion.  The Preamble also states that the states parties are 
“[r]esolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement 
of international justice.”244  Guaranteeing lasting respect for 
international justice arguably counsels against aggressive 
judicial crime creation.  Recalling Justice Jackson’s admonition 
at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg—“we must 
never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants 
today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow”—
overly expansive interpretations of crimes to fit the facts, it 
would seem, ultimately undermine respect for international 
justice.245  As for the guarantee to enforce international justice, 
this guarantee, like the notion of ending impunity for crimes, is 
question begging—enforcement of just what criminal prohibition? 
The use of the term “justice” seems to require fidelity to law; not 
just punishment.  Finally, the Rome Statute’s many fair trial-
related provisions, including the explicit requirement that trials 
comply with international human rights246 and the Article 22 
provisions on legality, are evidence that the ICC is not to seek 
convictions at all cost. 
It bears emphasis that this teleological inquiry into the 
Rome Statute should not be conflated with a teleological inquiry 
into an underlying IHL convention upon which the ICC was 
founded.247  The object and purpose of the underlying convention 
is likely to be to expand international humanitarian protection, 
as it should be.248  However, as noted, that is not the primary 
244 Id. (emphasis added). 
245 ROBERT H. JACKSON, OPENING STATEMENT NUREMBERG TRIALS (1945), 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/sources_document12.html. 
246 Id. at art. 21(3) (“The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this 
article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights . . .”). 
247 See generally Carstens, supra note 77 (describing difficulties in interpreting 
transplanted treaty rules). 
248 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Hadz̆ihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Separate 
and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hunt Command Responsibility Appeal, 
¶ 22 (July 16, 2003) (arguing in support of extending liability based on command 
responsibility for acts committed prior to a commander’s taking charge and citing as 
support the object and purpose of IHL: “The object and purpose of Additional 
Protocol I is, according to its Preamble, to ‘reaffirm and develop the provisions 
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object and purpose of the Rome Statute.  The object and purpose 
of the Rome Statute is to punish people found guilty, through a 
fair process, of international crimes.  Thus, contrary to the 
typical analysis in international courts, the teleological inquiry 
into underlying IHL conventions offers a strong argument in 
favor of reading the Rome Statute more narrowly than the 
underlying IHL convention. 
This interpretation of the Vienna Convention’s teleological 
inquiry may lead to greater “fragmentation” in international 
law,249 but perhaps not as much as it may seem.  Pursuant to 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the “general rule” of the 
Vienna Convention, judges still may consider the underlying IHL 
or international human rights “source” norm to assist in finding 
the “ordinary meaning” of a term in one of the Rome Statute’s 
crime definitions.250  It merely may not shroud expansions in the 
law in the justification of achieving the Rome Statute’s purported 
“object and purpose” of “ending impunity.” 
The object and purpose of the Rome Statute, properly 
understood, includes an element of gravity.  As noted above, and 
exemplified by the “most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community” language in the Preamble, the Rome 
Statute gravity requirements are sprinkled throughout the 
protecting the victims of armed conflicts and to supplement measures intended to 
reinforce their application’, which accords neatly with the object and purpose of 
international humanitarian law generally: ‘The aim of international humanitarian 
law is to protect the human being and to safeguard the dignity of man in the 
extreme situation of war. The provisions of international humanitarian law have 
always been tailored to fit human requirements. They are bound to an ideal: the 
protection of man from the consequences of brute force’ ”); see also supra notes 10, 
11, and 15. 
249 See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-First Session, 
¶ 251(1), UN Doc A/61/10 (2006), [hereinafter ILC Report on Fragmentation]. See 
also Michael Waibel, Interpretive Communities in International Law, in 
INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 164 (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds., 2015) 
(discussing the fragmentation of interpretive communities and noting that “[t]he 
extensive discourse on fragmentation in international law oscillates between the two 
extreme poles: the view that fragmentation poses a mortal threat to the 
international legal order, or that it is a natural outgrowth of international law’s 
advanced state of development, mirroring earlier developments in national law”). 
250 See Carstens, supra note 77, at 236 (noting that “a transplanted treaty rule 
might become so ubiquitous within a particular series of treaties that an ‘ordinary 
meaning’ can be ascribed to the common terms within it by reference to the wider 
body of earlier treaties” but noting that “the [other] primary elements” including 
object and purpose of the general rule are less applicable than “ordinary meaning”). 
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definitions of crimes.251  The Rome Statute also requires 
consideration of gravity as a jurisdictional matter and as a 
matter of prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to bring 
charges.252 
At least one ICC judge appears to endorse an understanding 
of Article 22(2) that recognizes a role for the Vienna Convention 
and yet keeps teleological analysis from swallowing strict 
construction.  In Ngudjolo, Judge Van den Wyngaert wrote a 
concurring opinion to express her views on the proper 
interpretation of the Rome Statute’s provision on forms of 
criminal responsibility.253  She noted that “the Court must first 
apply the applicable rules of interpretation, as provided for by 
the Statute and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” 
including the travaux préparatoires.254  However, emphasizing 
the importance of the strict construction or, as she called it, the 
in dubio pro reo command of Article 22(2),255 she rejected the 
Vienna Convention’s teleological inquiry into the “objects and 
purposes” of a treaty.256 
B. Avoiding Unfair Surprise
This discussion on the Rome Statute’s “object and purpose”
relates to the next proposed guideline for strict construction—
avoiding unfair surprise.  This prescription is akin to the ECtHR 
notion of foreseeability,257 but makes clear that foreseeability is 
judged from the perspective of the defendant.  In reading the 
statute, supplemented by consultation of international law and 
general principles where needed, judges must consider whether a 
defendant could reasonably have understood his conduct to be 
criminal.  This focus speaks to the underlying human rights 
concern about notice to defendants.  Where the court is treading 
new ground, it must consider whether the defendant could have 
reasonably anticipated the criminality of his conduct. 
251 See supra Part III.B.3. 
252 See deGuzman, supra note 103, at 1405. 
253 Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 10 (Dec. 18, 2012). 
254 Id. ¶¶ 10–13. 
255 Id. ¶ 19 (stating “I believe that the express inclusion of the in dubio pro reo 
standard in Article 22(2) of the Statute is a highly significant characteristic of the 
Statute.”). 
256 Id. ¶ 18. 
257 See supra Part III.D. 
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This prescription has more bite to it than it may seem.  At 
the ad hoc tribunals and the SCSL, jurisdiction over defendants 
whose crimes often predated the courts’ statutes was contingent 
on the existence at the time of the defendant’s acts of an 
applicable crime in international law,258 either through a treaty 
or customary international law.  By contrast, at the ICC, the 
judges arguably need not find evidence that conduct is criminal 
under customary international law.  Rather, judges may consult 
customary international law and general principles to help them 
interpret the language of Rome Statute.259  If these sources 
support a particular reading of a term or of a general prohibition,  
then the judges may use this reading as support for the 
proposition that the conduct is included in the Rome Statute’s 
crime. 
Although the Rome Statute does not purport to codify 
customary international law, a preexisting international criminal 
norm strongly suggests that the risk of unfair surprise is low. 
Where language in a crime definition is ambiguous, and there is 
weak evidence that particular conduct is criminal according to 
the general principles of international law, including customary 
international law, the risk of unfair surprise is high.  In essence, 
the absence of a customary international law norm criminalizing 
particular conduct amounts to a presumption of unfair surprise. 
This presumption can be overcome through consultation of 
general principles derived from national judicial systems or 
perhaps from evidence that customary international law and  
258 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial 
Judgement, ¶¶ 198–203 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002) 
(finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant for the crime of 
“violence to life and person” since it was unconvinced that “violence to life and 
person” amounted to a crime under customary international law). 
259 For example, in the ICC’s first case, Lubanga, the Trial Chamber consulted 
IHL treaties and customary IHL to understand the meaning of the Rome Statute’s 
war crime based on “use of children to participate [] in hostilities.” In reaching a 
broad definition of “use to participate in the hostilities” the Trial Chamber relied on 
customary international law evidence that use of children in support roles was 
prohibited, not that IHL showed that it was a crime. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 619–628 
(Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter “Lubanga Judgment”]; cf. Marko Milanovic, Is the Rome 
Statute Binding on Individuals? (And Why We Should Care), 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
25, 27 (2011) (asking whether the Rome Statute is jurisdictional or substantive). 
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treaty law understands a particular term in a particular way, 
even if it does not recognize that it is a crime, but the evidence 
must be very strong. 
Thus, strict construction can be read as a command to 
engage in more rigorous customary international law analysis 
than international courts have sometimes employed.260  As 
Joseph Powderly has noted of the customary international law 
analysis of the ad hoc tribunals,  
There is . . . a legitimate concern that recourse to ‘new’ norms of 
customary international law, identified on the basis of 
questionable evidence of state practice and opinio juris, may be 
used as a means of concealing the arbitrary development of the 
law and its fraught relationship with the principle of legality.261  
The flexibility of customary international law analysis inherently 
lends itself to the risk that the existence and content of the norm 
depend on the eye of the beholder, and courts must be careful in 
basing expansive interpretations of crimes in arguments based 
on customary international law. 
This guideline that courts avoid unfair surprise is not, 
however, a requirement that any particular defendant have 
actual notice that his conduct was illegal.262  The question is 
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would 
have been on notice that her conduct was criminal.  There is no 
unfair surprise where there is sufficiently clear support for an 
interpretation in some source of law recognized whether or not 
260 Judge Roberston’s dissent from an SCSL’s trial chamber’s finding of 
jurisdiction for the crime of recruiting children into armed forces accuses the 
majority of suspect customary international law analysis and defends a more 
rigorous inquiry into customary international law. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. 
SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, ¶ 22 (Spec. Ct. for 
Sierra Leone May 31, 2004). 
261 Powderly, supra note 198, at 237; see also id. at 236 (“There is a definite 
danger then that the convenient selectiveness of established and newly identified 
customary rules is being used as a fail-safe mechanism when compliance with the 
principle of legality is brought into question as a consequence. Some critical scholars 
might even go as far as to say that, before the international criminal tribunals, 
customary international law is to be considered inherently malleable and capable of 
saying whatever you want it to say. This is perhaps excessively cynical and certainly 
only attaches to a minority of cases; however, the critique is not without some 
merit.”). 
262 The defendant in the ICC’s first case made a notice or ignorance of the law 
argument, which the Pretrial Chamber rejected on the basis that the Rome Statute 
itself had made enlistment of child soldiers a crime prior to Lubanga’s conduct. See 
Milanovic, supra note 259, at 34. 
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the defendant knew about it.263  The further from ICL and IHL 
the norm is, arguably, the less reasonable it would be to impute 
knowledge of the norm to the defendant.  It puts the onus on 
military and civilian leaders in conflict situations to know the 
legal landscape in which they are operating.  This landscape 
includes not only IHL, but also international human rights law 
and ICL, both customary and treaty-based.  It may include notice 
stemming from general principles derived from national systems, 
but these domestic legal principles are an area to be treated with 
extreme care since the risk of unfair surprise is high.  While 
there may be unfair surprise concerns with attributing 
knowledge of international law to international defendants, these 
concerns are far greater still when the court begins to assume a 
mastery of comparative criminal law unless there is near 
uniformity on a rule. 
Thus, if judges are inquiring into the possibility of unfair 
surprise due to a new application or interpretation of an 
ambiguous or vague provision of the Rome Statute, and are 
looking to customary international law for guidance, as this 
Article suggests they should, judges should look for strong 
evidence of both state practice and opinio juris in support of a 
crime under customary international law or, at a minimum, of a 
clear international norm supporting a particular reading of a 
Rome Statute crime.  This traditional approach to identifying 
customary international law may not be optimal from a 
“utopian,” ending-impunity vantage point,264 but it is more 
defensible from the vantage point of legality and strict 
construction.  
263 Here, the author agrees with Gallant, who adopts Jerome Hall’s argument 
that “[i]f an act can reasonably be construed as within the ambit of definition of the 
crime existing at the time of the act (whether statutory, common law, or 
international law), the actor is sufficiently warned so that a conviction will not a 
violate the customary international law version of nullum crimen sine lege.” 
GALLANT, supra note 4, at 360 (quoting Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 
YALE L.J. 165 (1937)). 
264 ILC CIL 1, supra note 18, ¶ 98 (describing modern arguments that 
customary international law norms could be found on either state practice or opinio 
juris alone). 
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C. Maximizing Clarity
Finally, judges should aim to make—or interpret—law in a
way that leads to greater clarity in the law.265  Jeffries proposes 
that judges ask the following questions: 
Would this interpretation, taken as precedent, constrain future 
applications?  Or would it merely multiply the possibilities? 
Would the decision resolve the ambiguity in the law, or merely 
exploit it?  Of course, not every rule is a good rule, but the lack 
of any rule is usually a bad idea.  To be avoided, therefore, is an 
interpretation that creates or perpetuates openendedness in the 
criminal law.266 
ICL could benefit from clarification.  Despite the codification of 
ICL in the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes, ICL is still 
a relatively nascent field and many critical questions on the 
nature and elements of criminal responsibility remain to be 
answered.267 
Clarifying the norms often will mean interpreting them 
consistently with underlying international human rights and 
IHL norms.  Interpreting the Rome Statute consistently with 
international human rights norms and IHL will often make 
sense, particularly since the Rome Statute often explicitly directs 
judges to interpret the crimes consistently with those bodies of 
law.  As the International Law Commission (“ILC”) has noted in 
its findings on the “fragmentation” of international law: 
International law as a legal system.  International law is a legal 
system.  Its rules and principles (i.e. its norms) act in relation to 
and should be interpreted against the background of other rules 
and principles.  As a legal system, international law is not a 
random collection of such norms.  There are meaningful 
relationships between them.268 
265 Sadat and Jolly likewise list clarifying the law as one of their proposed 
principles of interpretation. See Sadat & Jolly, supra note 14, at 764. 
266 Jeffries, supra note 22, at 220–221 (“Such an interpretation should be 
avoided not because it would be unfair or unwise in the instant case (that might or 
might not be true), but because it would invite abuse in the future.”). 
267 See, e.g., Valerie Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal 
Court: Advancing International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 608–09, 622–23 
(2004) (discussing the lack of clarity on the elements of and relationship between 
sexual slavery and enslavement). See deGuzman, supra note 219, at 1 (noting that 
the meaning of the state policy requirement for crimes against humanity in the 
Rome Statute is unclear). 
268 See ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 249, ¶ 251(1) (“Norms may 
thus exist at higher and lower hierarchical levels, their formulation may involve 
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Moreover, the ILC has recommended harmonization:  “It is a 
generally accepted principle that when several norms bear on a 
single issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so 
as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations.”269 
This goal of increasing clarity in—and harmonization of—the 
law is in tension with this Article’s argument that the objects and 
purposes of underlying IHL and human rights treaties not be 
confused with the object and purpose of the Rome Statute.270  
Indeed, this Article’s object and purpose thesis permits at least 
some divergence between IHL and ICL.  As the negative reaction 
in the military community to the ICTY’s Gotovina decision on 
targeting illustrates, clarity, at least in international law as a 
whole, often is not enhanced by a different norm in ICL and 
IHL.271  Likewise, had the ICC, in its judgments in the Lubanga 
case, decided, international human rights and IHL principles 
notwithstanding, that only use of children in fighting and not in 
support roles sufficed for the crime of enlistment and recruitment 
of child soldiers, there is some risk that the narrow ICL norm 
announced would have muddied the waters for the human rights 
and IHL norms.  Indeed, the United Nations Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on Children and Armed 
Conflict, who testified as an expert in the case, seemed very  
concerned that ICL, international human rights law and IHL be 
striking the same note.272  To be sure, there is a cost in 
recognizing a narrower ICL rule. 
Nevertheless, despite the overlap in the fields of ICL, IHL, 
and international human rights and the benefits of 
harmonization, there is a strong argument that ICL is what the 
ILC would call a “[s]pecial (self-contained) regime” distinct from 
IHL or international human rights law due to the distinctive 
requirements of criminal law, including legality and strict 
construction.273  Thus, it is appropriate that the Rome Statute’s 
crimes sometimes will cover a narrower swath of conduct than 
IHL or international human rights norms. 
greater or lesser generality and specificity and their validity may date back to 
earlier or later moments in time.”). 
269 ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 249, ¶ 251(4). 
270 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
271 See discussion supra note 193. 
272 Davidson, supra note 147, at 395–400. 
273 ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 249, ¶ 251(11)–(12). 
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ICC judges can help to clarify the contours of the ICC crime 
and the relationship between these fields of international law 
through careful and clear decisions articulating where and why 
the Rome Statute’s interpretation of ICL differs from the 
underlying international human rights and IHL norms in certain 
contexts.  The ICC is uniquely positioned to play this role of 
clarifying the law and, where appropriate, identifying 
developments in ICL.  In domestic jurisdictions, due to a lack of 
familiarity with international law, the strange footing of 
international law in the country’s law, or a state’s aversion to a 
particular norm, judges are “likely to (and perhaps should) adopt 
a cautious approach to developing the law.”274  By contrast, ICL, 
IHL, and international human rights law, are the bread and 
butter of all cases before the ICC, and ICC judges typically have 
extensive backgrounds in at least one of these fields, and often 
more than one.275  Thus, the ICC is likely to be in a better 
position, from a resource, knowledge, and, in some 
circumstances, political perspective, to identify the emergence of 
new customary international law norms than most.  A key 
component in achieving this aim is transparent reasoning and 
explicit customary international law and comparative criminal 
law analysis in judgments. 
D. Avoiding Case-Specific Crime Creation
Jeffries’s final caveat—that judges should avoid case-specific
lawmaking—bears particular consideration in the ICC context. 
One of the justifications offered for judicial lawmaking in the 
international criminal context—and the international context 
generally—is the desire to give judges the flexibility to adapt to 
changing circumstance and new and varied forms of harm.276  
This interest stands in tension with this guideline of avoiding ad 
hoc lawmaking in order to fit the law to the facts of a particular 
case before the court.277  Judges must be mindful to take into 
274 ILC CIL 1, supra note 18, at 37. 
275 See generally Who’s Who, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/judicial-divisions/biographies/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 28, 
2017). 
276 See discussion supra note 13. 
277 As Fletcher notes, “[t]he critical feature of these legislative warnings is that 
they are systematic, abstracted from particular controversies, and well defined,” 
which is why the “leading legal systems of the world converge in favoring legislation 
as the primary source of criminal law.” FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 80–81. 
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account changing circumstances in the world and warfare 
generally, rather than the facts of a given conflict or defendant. 
The international and hybrid tribunals have had a mixed record 
on this score.278 
In other words, judges should be thoughtful about how their 
interpretations of crimes will apply beyond the case at hand. 
This insight seems rather obvious and yet, it may be easier than 
one thinks for judges to lose sight of this goal in the face of 
atrocities, albeit ones that may not tidily fit into a particular 
definition of the Rome Statute, and in the name of “closing the 
impunity gap.”  Again, this Article offers an alternative 
interpretation of the object and purpose of the Rome Statute—as 
a tribunal that is charged with punishing those responsible for 
grave international crimes in a manner consistent with the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
This Article offers these guidelines as an alternative to 
overly strict and unrealistic notions of lenity that require 
ignoring sources of law in a manner inconsistent with Article 21 
and to the prevailing reductionist and permissive vision of strict 
construction of the ECtHR.  The hope is that these guidelines are 
clearer and better comport with the justifications for strict 
construction in the ICC context, the strongest of which are notice, 
respecting state intent—whether as an end in itself or for the 
instrumental goal of encouraging state participation in the ICC 
framework—promoting respect for human rights and the rule of 
law, and helping to ensure that the court focus its limited 
resources on grave crimes.  Finally, it explicitly and 
transparently recognizes that the primary job of ICC judges is to 
reach the best, rather than the narrowest, interpretation of the 
Rome Statute, a document that is going to need some 
interpreting. 
The institutional design of the ICC helps to ensure that it 
will not be overly aggressive in interpreting its crimes.  At least 
one commentator has argued that the ICC is a bad place for 
lawmaking, because, unlike the ad hoc tribunals, it has 
jurisdiction over the world’s future conflicts, rather than a 
defined, largely past, regional conflict that involved crimes that 
the international community has already recognized to be 
sufficiently grave through the very creation of an ad hoc 
278 See Davidson, supra note 147, at 413. 
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tribunal.279  On the contrary, the ICC’s jurisdiction over future 
crimes committed by a national of any state party or on the 
territory of a state party, or by anyone, anywhere, should the 
Security Council refer the matter to the court, makes it unlikely 
the court will be too bold.  Judges are well aware of the context in 
which they operate.  States parties have various tools, including 
refusing to cooperate with the court, voicing their disagreement, 
or, if they disagree strongly enough with an interpretation of a 
crime, exiting from the Rome Statute treaty regime.280  This 
institutional context, in conjunction with the statute’s gravity 
requirements and the court’s resource constraints, is likely to put 
powerful pressure on judges not to use expansive readings of the 
law to take on marginal cases. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, lenity comes last at the ICC, but strict construction 
remains.  Though not all of the justifications for strict 
construction apply as readily at the ICC as in domestic 
jurisdictions, strict construction still implicates legitimate 
concerns in the ICC context.  To address these concerns, judges 
should interpret the crimes in the Rome Statute in a manner 
that avoids usurping the authority of states and unfairly 
surprising defendants and that enhances the clarity of ICL.  The 
proposed conceptions of the “object and purpose” of the Rome 
Statute and the role of customary international law and general 
principles derived from national laws set out above can help 
judges to navigate these guidelines and, ultimately, to make good 
law. 
279 Lietzau, supra note 47, at 482. 
280 See generally Wessel, supra note 59. 
